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Security Council

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Letter dated 10 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the summary statement by the Secretary-General of matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration, dated 2 January 2018 (S/2018/10), and wish to request that item 62 therein, entitled "The situation between Iran and Iraq", be retained in the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gholamali **Khoshroo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-00520 (E) 150118

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United Nations S/2018/34

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 January 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 3 January 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), I have the honour to refer to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 1977 (2011) and to transmit herewith the 2017 review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) (see annex).

I would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Sacha Sergio **Llorentty Soliz**
Chair
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)

18-01259 (E) 080218

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Annex

Review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) for 2017

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 1540 (2004), the Security Council expressed its intention to monitor closely the implementation of the resolution and, at the appropriate level, to take further decisions that might be required. On 20 April 2011, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1977 (2011). Under paragraph 9 of resolution 1977 (2011), the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) is mandated to prepare a review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) before the end of December each year, addressing in particular all aspects of paragraphs 1 to 3 of the resolution, including developing and maintaining efforts to implement the resolution in accordance with national legal authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law. In its resolution 2325 (2016), adopted on 15 December 2016, the Council welcomed the continuous submission of the annual review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), prepared with the assistance of the Committee's Group of Experts, in December each year.

2. The present review focuses on the implementation of the Committee's sixteenth programme of work (S/2017/126, annex) during the period from 1 January to 31 December 2017.[1]

II. Progress and achievements

3. In 2017, the Committee, chaired by Sacha Sergio Llorentty Soliz (Plurinational State of Bolivia), continued to facilitate and monitor the implementation by States of resolution 1540 (2004). The Committee held two formal sessions in the course of the year.

4. The Committee's work was facilitated by the working group on monitoring and national implementation, coordinated by Ryo Kaneko and Atsushi Morita (Japan); the working group on assistance, coordinated by Alexia Jarrot (France), which held two informal sessions; the working group on cooperation with international organizations, coordinated by Bassem Hassan and Tarek Mahfouz (Egypt); and the working group on transparency and media outreach, coordinated by Craig Finkelstein (United States of America), which held one informal session.

A. Monitoring and national implementation

5. The Security Council, in paragraph 12 of its resolution 2325 (2016), decided that the Committee should continue to intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation by all States of resolution 1540 (2004) through its programme of work. The Committee and its Group of Experts continued the compilation and general examination of information on the status of States' implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), in addition to their efforts at outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation. In its relevant interaction with Member States, and in accordance with resolution 2325 (2016), the Committee gave due attention to enforcement measures; measures relating to biological, chemical and nuclear weapons; proliferation finance

[1] The 2017 review contains data and information received as at 22 December 2017. Data and information received after that date will be reflected in the 2018 review.

measures; accounting for and securing related materials; and national export and trans-shipment controls.

6. In accordance with its sixteenth programme of work, the Committee briefed the Security Council on its activities on 11 May 2017 in a joint session with the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001).

7. Following the completed revision of matrices in 2016, and in accordance with the sixteenth programme of work, the Committee's working group on monitoring and national implementation considered how to improve the process for updating the Committee's matrices. In this regard, the working group recommended a method for the systematic review of the matrices before the next comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), which is to be completed before 25 April 2021.

8. The working group also recommended streamlining the matrix format by reducing the number of measures to be recorded to more closely follow the obligations set out in resolution 1540 (2004). In accordance with the sixteenth programme of work, the revised matrix also reflects an approach that takes into account the specificity of States with respect to their ability to manufacture and export related materials. The revised matrix format was considered and approved by the Committee. In 2018, the existing matrices will be converted to the new format. In future, the matrices will be revised systematically on the basis of the new format.

9. In its resolution 2325 (2016), the Security Council called upon all States that had not yet done so to submit a first report to the Committee without delay. In the context of achieving universal reporting as outlined in the sixteenth programme of work, the Committee continued its efforts to encourage the submission of such reports, including through direct interaction and bilateral meetings. In this regard, in August 2017 the Chair wrote to the remaining 16 States that had not yet submitted reports to encourage them to send to the Committee their first report in line with resolutions 1540 (2004) and 2325 (2016) and held bilateral meetings with the delegation of Equatorial Guinea. Furthermore, the Committee's Group of Experts conducted visits to Mauritania and to Timor-Leste, at the request of those States, to assist them in drafting their first national reports. The Group of Experts also held bilateral discussions with some non-reporting States, including in the margins of events relating to resolution 1540 (2004). As a result, Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe submitted their first reports to the Committee in 2017. The total number of States that have provided such reports is now 179 out of the 193 Member States.

10. In the same resolution, the Security Council encouraged States to provide additional information on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including, on a voluntary basis, on their laws and regulations and effective practices in implementing the resolution. During the reporting period, two States, India and Pakistan, provided such additional information, including on measures related to prohibiting non-State actors from using nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, as well as on measures to establish national controls to prevent the proliferation and illicit trafficking of such weapons and related materials.

11. In its resolution 2325 (2016), the Security Council also encouraged States to prepare, on a voluntary basis, national implementation action plans mapping out their priorities and plans for implementing the key provisions of resolution 1540 (2004). In 2017, six such plans were submitted. Kyrgyzstan submitted its second voluntary national implementation action plan, while Belize, Chile, Panama, Peru and Tajikistan submitted their first plans, bringing to 31 the total number of such plans received by

the Committee since 2007. All of the plans submitted in 2017 were developed with the assistance of the Committee's Group of Experts, which was also involved in efforts to develop new plans and review the implementation of existing plans through direct interaction with El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Suriname and Tajikistan in 2017. The plans of El Salvador, Guatemala and Mongolia were still being drafted at the end of the year.

12. The Security Council, in its resolution 2325 (2016), recognized that it was important that the Committee continue to engage actively in dialogue with States on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), including through visits to States at their invitation. In 2017, in addition to the visits to Mauritania and Timor-Leste, the Committee undertook visits to El Salvador and Guatemala to assist with the drafting of national implementation action plans. Those visits provided an opportunity to exchange updated information on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), to identify achievements, gaps and assistance needs and, where appropriate, to map out future actions to implement the resolution. During the visits, relevant national officials, including senior-level government representatives, met with the Committee's experts.

13. States are encouraged to inform the Committee of their points of contact for resolution 1540 (2004), both in their capitals and in their permanent missions to the United Nations in New York. Points of contact can facilitate internal coordination of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) as well as collaboration between States and contact with the Committee. In 2017, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Costa Rica and Mauritania named their points of contact. To date, a total of 101 Member States have informed the Committee of their points of contact for resolution 1540 (2004).

14. In its sixteenth programme of work, the Committee encouraged expansion of the network of points of contact for resolution 1540 (2004) and the continuation of training courses conducted at the regional level for points of contact. In this regard, a training course was held in Xi'an, China, for a second time, with the participation of members of the Committee and instructors from its Group of Experts and supported by the Office for Disarmament Affairs, from 7 to 11 August 2017. Discussions are ongoing with the African Union concerning the holding of a training course for points of contact in African States in 2018.

15. In its sixteenth programme of work, the Committee recognized the need to promote the sharing of experience through peer reviews and other means, table-top exercises to evaluate and reinforce effective practices, and lessons learned. In 2017, the Group of Experts participated in peer review meetings organized with the support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific; the meetings were held between Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Dushanbe in August and between Chile and Colombia in Bogota and Santiago in October. Among other topics, effective practices in the implementation of obligations under resolution 1540 (2004), specifically in the area of export and border controls, were also discussed at two Wiesbaden process conferences: one that was held in Mexico City for the region of the Pacific Alliance States and Brazil, and the other a global conference held in Wiesbaden, Germany. The objective of the Wiesbaden series of meetings is to promote active dialogue between States and industry on the effective implementation of export controls. In addition, in November 2017 the Government of Ukraine hosted an international workshop to promote the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in the context of evolving proliferation risks and challenges.

16. At the initiative of the Plurinational State of Bolivia during its presidency of the Security Council in June 2017, the Council held an open debate on the global effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors on

28 June 2017. The Council heard statements highlighting proliferation threats, including relevant developments in science and technology, intangible technology transfer and proliferation financing.

B. Assistance

17. The Committee continued to work towards improving the effectiveness of its assistance mechanism. On the basis of the findings of the comprehensive review, the Committee decided in its sixteenth programme of work that its working group on assistance should specifically focus on the Committee's assistance mechanisms to find ways of developing more effective matching strategies and to consider, in general, how to improve the facilitation of technical assistance to States, including by fulfilling its role as a clearing house in a more comprehensive and timely manner.

18. In accordance with its sixteenth programme of work and in fulfilling its clearing-house function in a transparent manner, the Committee continued to post on its website summaries of requests for assistance from Member States, as well as offers of assistance from Member States and a number of international, regional and subregional organizations or other entities. The Committee and its experts also maintain a consolidated list of assistance requests, indicating where offers and requests for assistance have been matched, to be used as required in response to requests for information and, as appropriate, at outreach events. In 2017, the Group of Experts provided a quarterly update on ongoing matching activities, in particular a summary of new assistance requests and offers to the Chair of the working group on assistance.

19. The Group of Experts continued its consultations with officials from States during various outreach events, including during visits to States and national round tables on the implementation of obligations under resolution 1540 (2004), and regularly provided information about and illustrated methods of assistance that could help States strengthen their legislative and regulatory frameworks related to resolution 1540 (2004). They also explained the clearing-house role of the Committee, which is designed to facilitate the flow of information between States requesting assistance and providers of assistance.

20. The Committee and its Group of Experts continued to engage in dialogue with States requesting assistance and potential assistance providers, where appropriate, with the objective of realizing effective matches of existing assistance offers and requests.

21. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean continued to support States in Latin America and the Caribbean in strengthening the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in the region. In that regard, national round tables were organized in the capitals of Guyana, Peru and Suriname, with the participation of Committee experts, to support those States in drafting their voluntary national implementation action plans. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and OSCE provided similar support to Mongolia and four States in Central Asia. In that regard, meetings to review the implementation of existing voluntary national implementation action plans and to develop new plans were held with Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, in their respective capitals, and at the OSCE headquarters in Vienna.

22. The Inter-American Committee against Terrorism of the Organization of American States (OAS), in cooperation with the Group of Experts within the framework of its programme for the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in the Americas, also rendered technical assistance to El Salvador, Guatemala and Uruguay

for the development of their respective voluntary national implementation action plans.

23. In accordance with the sixteenth programme of work and with the objective of better supporting States in developing more detailed and effective assistance requests and providing them, in response to their requests, with more effective assistance that meets their needs, the Committee revised its assistance template in March 2017. The Committee believes that, in general, assistance requests need to be formulated in a more specific manner in order to give a clearer picture of the assistance needed.

24. The Committee's new assistance template provides more substantive guidance to States on the submission of more detailed requests, as it has a simplified layout that provides space for all the information necessary for an individual assistance request. The 2017 template thereby strengthens the Committee's efforts as a matchmaker, as it facilitates the inclusion of more detailed and accurate information on assistance needs and enables better responses to specific needs. The 2017 assistance template is available on the Committee's website.

25. In 2017, the Committee received new assistance requests from Belize, Kenya, and Tajikistan. Those requests were passed on to assistance providers, as appropriate, and summaries of the requests were published on the Committee's website. The requests from Belize and Tajikistan were also included in their voluntary national implementation action plans, which were submitted to the Committee.

26. In 2017, the Committee agreed on ways of developing more effective matching strategies. The Committee decided to take a more proactive approach to matching requests with offers, which includes more focused communication with States requesting assistance and with assistance providers, proactively contacting potential assistance providers and, where appropriate, assisting in initiating a dialogue between States requesting assistance and assistance providers. As urged in paragraph 20 of resolution 2325 (2016), the Committee decided to continue to convene conferences dedicated to matching assistance requests with offers in 2018.

27. The Committee also considered, in general, how to improve the facilitation of technical assistance to States. The Committee decided to task its Group of Experts, at the invitation of States and subject to available resources, with facilitating assistance more actively by developing assistance workshops and country-specific assistance projects for States or regions. With this decision, the Committee aims, in particular, at being able to close a gap in assistance for those States and regions that are committed to implementing their obligations but might not be a priority for States providing assistance.

C. Cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations

28. In 2017, the Committee continued to develop its collaboration with relevant international and regional organizations, including directly related United Nations entities.

29. As requested in paragraph 25 of resolution 2325 (2016), the Committee and its Group of Experts encouraged relevant international organizations (International Atomic Energy Agency, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), World Organization for Animal Health, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and World Health Organization) to highlight the obligations set out in resolution 1540 (2004) in their model legislation and/or guidelines, where appropriate, pertaining to instruments under their respective mandates and relevant to the resolution.

30. The Committee and its Group of Experts also invited relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to participate in training courses for points of contact for resolution 1540 (2004) to act as instructors and to enable participating States to understand synergies between the obligations set out in resolution 1540 (2004) and other international, regional or subregional obligations.

31. In this regard, the highlights in 2017 were as follows:

(a) The Committee and the experts intensified their collaboration with OPCW by participating in events organized by or in cooperation with OPCW. These included outreach and regional workshops, such as the International Conference on Chemical Disarmament and Security held in Doha in April; the regional meeting of national authorities in Asia on the Chemical Weapons Convention, held in Dubai, United Arab Emirates in May; and the regional meeting of national authorities in Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention, held in Banjul in July. One Committee expert participated in the stakeholder forum for States parties in Africa on the adoption of national implementing legislation related to the Chemical Weapons Convention, held in Yaoundé in September. A Committee expert also participated in the expert workshop on international chemical security coordination held in The Hague in September;

(b) The Committee also continued its cooperation with the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit. An expert participated in the training workshop for African national contact points for the Biological Weapons Convention, organized jointly by the Unit and the African Union and held in Addis Ababa in October. On 5 December, one of the Committee's experts participated in the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention. That event provided the opportunity to engage some non-reporting States and to conduct discussions with States and international organizations providing assistance about the activities in the next year to support the requests received by the Committee;

(c) The Committee and the experts continued their collaboration with the World Organization for Animal Health. A member of the Group of Experts participated in the second Global Conference on Biological Threat Reduction, held in Ottawa in November;

(d) The Committee and the experts continued their cooperation with the Financial Action Task Force and similar regional bodies through participation in events dedicated to proliferation financing. An expert participated in the plenary and working group meetings of the Task Force, which were held in Paris in February. The Group of Experts met with the Task Force secretariat on 12 December 2017 to discuss issues of common concern with regard to proliferation financing.

32. Regional and subregional organizations continued to play an active role in enhancing the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). In this regard, the principal activities included the following:

(a) The Group of Experts held consultations with the Defence and Security Division of the African Union Commission in New York on 28 October to discuss specific initiatives to support the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in Africa in 2018 and 2019, including training courses for points of contact for resolution 1540 (2004) for States in Africa;

(b) OSCE continued its close cooperation with the Committee and played a leading role in regional efforts to enhance the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). A Committee expert participated in the dialogue meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation in Vienna on 7 June. The Group of Experts participated in an international workshop on promoting the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in the context of evolving proliferation risks and challenges,

held in Kyiv in November. A member of the Group of Experts also participated in the meeting of regional experts on issues relating to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), held in Bukhara, Uzbekistan, at the end of November;

(c) The European Union continued its financial support for the promotion of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) with the adoption of Council decision (CFSP) 2017/809 on 11 May 2017;

(d) Through its Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, OAS continued to strengthen its cooperation with the Committee. A Committee expert participated in the seventeenth regular session of the Inter-American Committee, held in Washington, D.C. on 6 and 7 April. The Group of Experts participated in a seminar entitled "Security Council resolution 1540: enhancing strategic trade and border controls in Latin America and the Caribbean", organized jointly by OAS and Peru and held in Lima in April;

(e) A member of the Group of Experts participated in the ninth Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum intersessional meeting on non-proliferation and disarmament;

(f) The Group of Experts participated in the Summer School on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation organized jointly by Mexico and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean;

(g) As a member of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force since 2005, the Group of Experts continued its participation in the Task Force, where each participating entity makes contributions consistent with its own mandate. Specifically, the Group of Experts participated in the Task Force's working group on border management and law enforcement relating to counter-terrorism, with a view to obtaining information on partner programmes relevant to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), such as technical border control programmes to help States identify weapons of mass destruction and related materials. The Group of Experts also participated in meetings of the working group on preventing and responding to weapons of mass destruction terrorist attacks;

(h) The Committee continued to cooperate with the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and their experts, within their respective mandates. The expert groups and panels of the three committees continued to share relevant information in order to discuss common issues and coordinate actions. In February 2017, the Group of Experts undertook a joint country visit to Tajikistan led by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, which enabled the Committee and the Group of Experts to engage with appropriate officials in those countries on the full range of obligations pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004);

(i) The Chair briefed the Security Council on 11 May, together with the Chairs of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and of the Counter-Terrorism Committee;

(j) The Committee and its Group of Experts continued their interaction with UNODC on the implementation of the counter-terrorism conventions and the obligations set out in resolution 1540 (2004), with a view to enhancing future collaborative efforts, especially improving assistance coordination. The Group of Experts attended a coordination meeting with UNODC on 8 June in Vienna. An expert participated in a workshop on countering the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, held in Colombo in June. An expert also

participated in a national workshop on countering the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction held in Kathmandu in September;

(k) The Committee continued to cooperate with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa assisted in the organization of a workshop, held in Nouakchott from 4 to 6 July 2017, to support Mauritanian authorities in drafting a first national report. Together with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, the Group of Experts participated in the regional workshop on biosecurity in South-East Asia, organized by the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok in September;

(l) In 2017, the Committee continued its cooperation with other relevant entities and arrangements, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the G7 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. An expert participated in the workshop entitled "Vigilant Marmot" organized jointly by the Global Initiative and UNODC and held in Bratislava in January. A member of the Group of Experts attended the Global Partnership Working Group meeting in Rome in February.

D. Transparency and outreach

33. Transparency and outreach activities make important contributions to fostering greater cooperation and raising awareness among States, parliamentarians, relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and civil society, including industry, regarding the obligations set out in resolution 1540 (2004) and their implementation.

34. Direct outreach to States, relevant international, regional and subregional organizations and, where appropriate, civil society is important, and it is one of the principal tools to reach both wider and targeted audiences.

35. In 2017, the Chair, Committee members and experts participated in 52 outreach events (see enclosure).

36. While States are responsible for implementing the obligations set out in resolution 1540 (2004), parliamentarians and industry play important roles: the former because, in accordance with national procedures, their action is necessary to implement legislation to meet the requirements of paragraphs 2 and 3; the latter because industry is at the leading edge of implementation of national controls over related materials.

37. In this regard, the Chair of the Committee addressed the Interparliamentary Assembly of the States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in St. Petersburg, Russian Federation, in March 2017. In his address, the Chair highlighted the importance of resolution 1540 (2004) in preventing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, along with their delivery systems and related materials for their development and manufacture, from getting into the hands of non-State actors, including terrorists.

38. With respect to industry, the Committee and its Group of Experts participated in three events in 2017 that directly engaged industry and provided opportunities to work with and provide information for industry regarding its obligations under national laws:

(a) In March, China Machinery Engineering Corporation organized an internal compliance training event in Beijing, in cooperation with the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association. The objective of the training was to enhance awareness in order to promote internal compliance, especially regarding the obligations of industry under national export control laws and regulations, and to be consistent with the international non-proliferation requirements;

(b) A regional industry outreach conference for the Pacific Alliance States and Brazil was hosted by the Government of Mexico in Mexico City in June, in cooperation with the Office for Disarmament Affairs and supported by the Government of Germany;

(c) The fifth Wiesbaden process conference was hosted by Germany in Wiesbaden, Germany, in November.

39. In 2017, the Committee continued to maintain its website as a tool to raise public awareness and serve as a key source of information and resources relating to resolution 1540 (2004) for use by Member States, Committee members, civil society and industry. With support from the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the site was updated regularly. Those updates included:

(a) A calendar of past outreach events and workshops, as well as confirmed upcoming events, including information notes on such activities;

(b) A list of frequently asked questions;

(c) Identification by Member States and international organizations of national points of contact;

(d) The assistance request template, assistance requests and offers;

(e) National reports and voluntary national implementation action plans;

(f) Statements and presentations by the Chair and Committee members.

(g) A revised matrix template in line with the recommendations made in the 2016 comprehensive review.

40. In 2017, the Committee continued to publish quarterly messages from the Chair.[2] Transparency was further amplified by sending new information via email to a distribution list that included about 2,100 subscribers as at 22 December.

41. The new design of the Committee's website, finalized in 2016, has been launched, which provides enhanced usability and appeal.

42. In 2017, the website had seen 67,092 visits as at 22 December, which represented an increase of 1 per cent in comparison with the previous year.

43. In 2017, 5 press releases were published on Committee events, compared with 11 in 2016.

E. Administrative issues

44. The Department of Political Affairs and the Office for Disarmament Affairs continued to provide support for the Committee and its Group of Experts despite the difficulties of divided responsibilities.

45. In 2017, many of the activities of the Committee were supported by voluntary contributions to the United Nations trust fund for global and regional disarmament activities. In 2017, funds were used from grants provided in earlier years by Canada,

[2] Available from www.un.org/en/sc/1540/chair-message.

Germany, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea and the United States, and from new donations made by Japan and the European Union in 2017.

46. In its resolution 2325 (2016), the Security Council requested the Committee to undertake additional consideration, consistent with the report on the 2016 comprehensive review, of the efficiency and effectiveness of the special political mission that supports the Committee, and encouraged the Committee to report to the Security Council on the findings of this evaluation, in 2017, as appropriate. After initial consideration of this matter in accordance with the Committee's sixteenth programme of work, under the chairmanship of the Vice-Chairs of the Committee, Senegal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Committee was not able to reach consensus on the matter.

47. In June 2017, the Committee started a recruitment process for six new experts. Under the chairmanship of Sweden, Vice-Chair of the Committee, the Committee considered candidatures for expert positions submitted by Member States. The Committee confirmed the hiring of six new experts on 20 December 2017: Edith Valles (Argentina), Hongliu Zhang (China), Kiwako Tanaka (Japan), Michiel Combrinck (South Africa), Scott Spence (United States) and Jonathan Brewer (United Kingdom).

III. Final considerations

48. In 2017, a substantial amount of work was carried out by the Committee and its Group of Experts in accordance with the 2017 programme of work, but much remains to be done.

49. With regard to implementation, the number of States that have yet to submit their first reports has been reduced from 16 to 14. All of the non-reporting States were engaged on the issue, including with offers of assistance, in some cases more than once. The Committee will continue these efforts in 2018 and continue to encourage States to submit additional information on their implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).

50. In 2017, the revised matrix format was considered and approved by the Committee. In future, systematic revision of the matrices will be based on this new matrix format. In 2018, the Committee's existing matrices will be converted to the new format. The revision of matrices should be finalized before the next comprehensive review, to be completed by 25 April 2021.

51. The Committee should hold discussions on optimal approaches to enforcing appropriate effective laws for the prohibition of activities under paragraph 2 of resolution 1540 (2004).

52. The Committee should hold a closed, expert-level meeting to consider other issues highlighted in resolution 2325 (2016), namely the challenge of controlling access to intangible transfers of technology and to information that could be used for proliferation and accounting for and securing sensitive materials, inviting expert speakers as appropriate.

53. The training course for points of contact for resolution 1540 (2004) continues to prove its worth as a useful tool in fostering regional networks of officials dedicated to facilitating the implementation of the resolution. The Committee should continue to support the organization of such training courses in 2018.

54. The Committee should continue to engage with States that decided to invite the Committee to assist them in developing voluntary national implementation action plans, including in cooperation with other international and regional organizations

such as OAS, OSCE, the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre — Centre for Security Cooperation and regional centres such as the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific.

55. The first grant to the United Nations trust fund dedicated to assisting certain States in the Latin American and Caribbean region, provided by the Government of Canada to draft voluntary national implementation action plans, enhanced the Committee's opportunities for direct engagement with States in that region, in particular in response to their requests for assistance. To be able to continue this kind work with States, more such grants should be encouraged.

56. The Committee recognizes the need for a tailored dialogue with and among States on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) to ensure that the assistance given to requesting States corresponds to their national circumstances, priorities and needs. The Committee should continue to consider how to use existing resources to facilitate prompt and effective responses to assistance requests.

57. With regard to international cooperation, the Committee and its Group of Experts need to continue their collaboration with international organizations, in particular through direct interactions at the headquarters of the most relevant international organizations, during visits of representatives to New York or during any relevant international events. To promote a more active role among regional and subregional organizations in supporting the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), it is proposed that the Committee consider improving the coordination of planning for specific activities. Similarly, the Committee needs to enhance its cooperation with the regional centres of the Office for Disarmament Affairs to facilitate the engagement of States in a regional context.

58. The Committee should hold meetings with relevant specialized international organizations to improve cooperation in assistance and the exchange of information on technical issues. With the regional and subregional organizations, the Committee should develop collaboration on existing and future activities related to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and on related assistance, taking into account the regional context.

59. The Committee should continue to invite relevant international organizations to dedicated events relating to its activities (such as training sessions for points of contact). The Committee should consider organizing joint country visits with other international organizations at the invitation of States.

60. In 2017, the information posted on the Committee's website was updated to reflect the findings of the comprehensive review completed in December 2016. Electronic outreach through the Committee's website, which has proved valuable in previous years, will continue to be an important element of the Committee's awareness-raising activities. As resources permit, further development, including the enhancement of technology to support the management and use of the Committee's data, will be needed.

61. The Committee should consider additional strategies to increase traffic on its website.

62. The Committee should continue to increase efforts to raise awareness among parliamentarians and other high-level decision makers.

Enclosure

Outreach events held in 2017 attended by the Chair or members of the Committee and/or its Group of Experts

Date	*Description*	*Organizer(s)/sponsor(s)*	*Location*
Visits to States, at their invitation			
4–6 July	Workshop to support Mauritanian authorities in drafting their first national report	Mauritania, the Committee and the Office for Disarmament Affairs (United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa)	Nouakchott
11–13 October	National round table on reporting	Timor-Leste, the Committee and the Office for Disarmament Affairs (United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific)	Dili
20 and 21 March	National round table on the preparation of a voluntary national implementation action plan	El Salvador and the Committee	San Salvador
6 and 7 November	Finalization of the draft voluntary national implementation action plan	El Salvador, the Committee, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and OAS	San Salvador
27 and 28 November	Development of a voluntary national implementation action plan	Guatemala, the Committee, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and OAS	Guatemala City
Joint visits to States			
20–24 February	Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate visit to Tajikistan	Tajikistan and the Counter-Terrorism Committee	Dushanbe
Other country-specific activities			
8–10 March	National action plan implementation review meeting of Kyrgyzstan on resolution 1540 (2004)	Kyrgyzstan, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and OSCE	Vienna
12 April	National round table on identifying legal and technical assistance to facilitate the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004)	Suriname and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean	Paramaribo
18 and 19 April	National round table to develop a voluntary national implementation action plan for resolution 1540 (2004)	Uruguay, the Committee and OAS	Montevideo

Date	*Description*	*Organizer(s) sponsor(s)*	*Location*
8–10 May	National round table on strengthening the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and supporting the development of a voluntary national implementation action plan	Mongolia, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and OSCE	Ulaanbaatar
24–26 May	Meeting to review implementation of the 2014 national action plan of Uzbekistan to implement resolution 1540 (2004)	Uzbekistan, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and OSCE	Vienna
29 and 30 June	Round table on strengthening the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and developing a voluntary national implementation action plan	Turkmenistan, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and OSCE	Ashgabat
4 August	Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China	China and Committee experts	Beijing
18–21 September	National implementation action plan review meetings	Mongolia and Tajikistan, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific and OSCE	Vienna
Other outreach activities			
24–26 January	"Vigilant Marmot" workshop on legal frameworks, organized by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism	Slovakia, Canada, UNODC and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism	Bratislava
31 January	Thirteenth Asian senior-level talks on non-proliferation	Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	Tokyo
5–10 February	Workshop on nuclear security policy and practice on the African continent	African Centre for Science and International Security, James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies and Ghana	Accra
19–24 February	Plenary and working group meetings of the Financial Action Task Force	Financial Action Task Force	Paris
21–23 February	Twenty-fourth Asian export control seminar	Japan and the Centre for Information on Security Trade Control	Tokyo

Date	*Description*	*Organizer(s) sponsor(s)*	*Location*
22–24 February	G7 Global Partnership Working Group meeting	Italy, the Group of Seven and the Global Partnership Working Group	Rome
7 and 8 March	Advanced chemical safety and security management symposium	Pakistan	Islamabad
8 and 9 March	Ninth Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum inter-sessional meeting on non-proliferation and disarmament	New Zealand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum	Auckland, New Zealand
14 and 15 March	Regional seminar on resolution 1540 (2004)	Pakistan, the Committee and the Office for Disarmament Affairs	Islamabad
15 and 16 March	China Machinery Engineering Corporation internal compliance training	China Machinery Engineering Corporation and the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association	Beijing
27 and 28 March	Parliamentary conference on combating international terrorism	Interparliamentary Assembly of the States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly	St. Petersburg, Russian Federation
6 and 7 April	Seventeenth regular session of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism	Secretariat of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism of OAS	Washington, D.C.
10 and 11 April	International Conference on Chemical Disarmament and Security	Qatar and OPCW	Doha
24–26 April	Seminar entitled "Security Council resolution 1540: enhancing strategic trade and border controls in Latin America and the Caribbean"	Peru, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and OAS	Lima
16–18 May	Regional meeting of national authorities in Asia on the Chemical Weapons Convention	United Arab Emirates and OPCW	Dubai, United Arab Emirates
7 June	OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation plenary on resolution 1540 (2004) and its follow-up resolutions 1977 (2011) and 2325 (2016): Exchange of national export control experience and best practices of participating States	OSCE	Vienna

Date	*Description*	*Organizer(s)/sponsor(s)*	*Location*
	of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe		
8 and 9 June	Resolution 1540 (2004) regional industry outreach conference (Wiesbaden process) for the Pacific Alliance States and Brazil	Mexico, Germany and the Office for Disarmament Affairs	Mexico City
13 July	Summer School on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation	Mexico, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies	Mexico City
18–20 July	Regional meeting of national authorities in Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention	Gambia and OPCW	Banjul
22 and 23 June	National workshop on countering the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Sri Lanka and UNODC	Colombo
2–4 August	Peer review	Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific	Dushanbe
7–11 August	Training course for points of contact	China and the Committee	Xi'an, China
12 and 13 September	National workshop on countering the financing of terrorism and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	Nepal and UNODC	Kathmandu
12–14 September	OPCW African stakeholder forum	Cameroon and OPCW	Yaoundé
14 and 15 September	Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre — Centre for Security Cooperation seminar on national implementation action plans	Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre — Centre for Security Cooperation and the Office for Disarmament Affairs	Ratkije, Croatia
19–21 September	Global summit on chemical safety and security	China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation and the International Centre for Chemical Safety and Security	Shanghai, China

Date	*Description*	*Organizer(s) sponsor(s)*	*Location*
27 and 28 September	Regional workshop on biosecurity in South-East Asia	Thailand and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific	Bangkok
28 and 29 September	Expert workshop on international chemical security coordination	OPCW	The Hague
4 October	Development of a voluntary national implementation action plan for Guyana	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean	Georgetown
4–6 October	Peer review, Chile and Colombia, phase 1	Chile, Colombia and the Committee	Bogota
17 and 18 October	Training workshop for African national contact points for the Biological Weapons Convention	Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit and the African Union Commission	Addis Ababa
19–21 October	2017 Moscow non-proliferation conference	Centre for Energy and Security Studies	Moscow
24–26 October	Peer review, Chile and Colombia, phase 2	Chile, Colombia and the Committee	Santiago
31 October–2 November	Second Global Conference on Biological Threat Reduction	Canada and the World Organization for Animal Health	Ottawa
2 and 3 November	International workshop on promoting the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) in the context of evolving proliferation risks and challenges	Ukraine	Kyiv
23 and 24 November	Fifth Wiesbaden process conference	Germany and the Committee	Wiesbaden, Germany
27 and 28 November	Meeting of regional experts on issues relating to the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004)	Uzbekistan and OSCE	Bukhara, Uzbekistan
4–8 December	Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention	States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention	Geneva

Abbreviations: OAS, Organization of American States; OPCW, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; OSCE, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

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Letter dated 10 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to submit herewith a non-paper, compiled by the delegation of the United States, containing an assessment of the positions of the Russian Federation regarding the use of chemical weapons in Syria. It is the hope of the United States delegation that this non-paper will serve as a reference in continued discussions in the Council on chemical weapons use in Syria.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nikki R. **Haley**

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Annex to the letter dated 10 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Assessment of the positions of the Russian Federation regarding the use of chemical weapons in Syria

The Russian Federation has criticized the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-Finding Missions (FFM) and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), calling into question the impartiality and credibility of their respective investigations and the professionalism of their staffs. These Russian arguments are misleading, unprofessional, inconsistent and, at times, completely false. They appear to represent an intentional effort to sow confusion and to protect the Assad regime's continued use of chemical weapons. It is revealing to analyse some of these Russian allegations more closely:

Russian allegation No. 1: *The sarin used in Syria came from Iraq. Sarin used in Syria could have come from old Gaddafi stockpiles in Libya.* (Statements by the Russian Foreign Ministry Director for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, Mikhail Ulyanov, in TASS on 26 April 2017)

- Not possible. Russia has provided no evidence to support this claim. Libya gave up producing sarin after its first attempts in the 1980s. Iraq's residual sarin munitions are entombed in a bunker and the last time they were tested — 15 years ago — they contained no more than 10 to 15 per cent sarin. Moreover, Syria used hexamine as a stabilizer in its sarin — a fact supported by OPCW samples collected in 2014 from the stockpile belonging to Syria. Neither Libya nor Iraq used hexamine to produce sarin.

Russian allegation No. 2: *Westerners ruled out the option of visiting the airbase ... and Khan Shaykhun.* (Comment by the Information and Press Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry to the OPCW on 30 May 2017, and statements by Mikhail Ulyanov in TASS on 26 September 2017)

- Misleading. Following the attack of 4 April, the OPCW, in consultation with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, explored all possibilities to visit the attack site. When the Assad regime denied immediate access, the OPCW Director General determined that the security risks associated with the deployment to Khan Shaykhun outweighed any additional corroboration of the facts or evidence that could be obtained. Instead, the FFM used the methodology of interviewing witnesses at a safe location, as it had since June 2014.

- In addition, the Syrian regime took samples it claimed were from Khan Shaykhun and provided them to the OPCW for analysis. Syria's own samples confirmed the presence of sarin and match the samples that the OPCW collected in 2014 from the stockpile belonging to the Assad regime. These samples further diminished any benefit the FFM could gain from visiting the site.

- Though the FFM did not investigate Al-Shayrat airfield because it was not directly relevant to the issue of confirming whether chemical weapons use took place, the JIM did visit the Al-Shayrat airbase as part of its investigation, once this was allowed by the Assad regime.

Russian allegation No. 3: *Chain of custody for sampling was not followed. There was a reliance on witnesses linked to the opposition of the Assad regime.* (Comment by the Information and Press Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry to the OPCW on 30 May 2017. Russian summary of Russian arguments in favour of

introducing a new Security Council resolution on JIM mandate renewal, 3 November 2017)

- False and misleading. As for potential witness bias, the JIM did not obscure the fact that Khan Shaykhun has been under opposition control since 2014, but its conclusions did not rest on witness testimony alone. Chain of custody procedures were consistent with OPCW practice and the procedures used in previous investigations. Specimens from autopsies were taken in the presence of the FFM team and remained in FFM custody until transfer to the OPCW laboratory personnel. Blood and other specimen samples from living victims were taken using equipment and vials provided by the FFM. The samples were split between two separate OPCW-certified, designated laboratories to perform independent analyses. The FFM and JIM also collected and independently verified photographs, video footage, witness testimony, overhead imagery and expert analysis.

Russian allegation No. 4: *Claims of sarin use are baseless.* (Statements by Russian Defense Ministry, Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Industry and Trade at press conference in Sputnik on 2 November 2017)

- False. Though the Russian Federation makes these comments to the press, at the Security Council and at the OPCW, Russia has not disputed the presence of sarin. In addition, the Syrian regime provided the OPCW its own samples, which it claims came from Khan Shaykhun. These samples tested positive for sarin or a sarin-like substance that was composed of methylphosphonic difluoride, which contained marker chemicals unique to Syria's binary sarin, and match the samples that the OPCW collected in 2014 from the stockpile belonging to the Assad regime. Binary sarin suggests a higher competence and sophistication in production, pointing to chemical plant production.

Russian allegation No. 5: *The FFM and JIM are not composed of geographically representative experts.* (Russian summary of Russian arguments in favour of introducing a new Security Council resolution on JIM mandate renewal, 3 November 2017)

- False. The members of the FFM teams are selected by the OPCW Director General from a pool of qualified and specially trained inspectors who are at the disposal of the OPCW. The inspectors appointed fulfil the prerequisite of broad geographical distribution; all regional groups are represented. The JIM was also composed of experts from geographically diverse backgrounds, from many continents.

Russian allegation No. 6: *The event was staged. Terrorists detonated a sarin bomb on the ground, the Syrian Su-22 aircraft in the air were not close enough to have dropped bombs on Khan Shaykhun, and the injured arrived in hospitals with symptoms before the attack occurred.* (Statements by Mikhail Ulyanov in TASS on 26 September 2017. Russian additional assessment of the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism seventh report on 9 November 2017.)

- False and misleading. Edmond Mulet, Head of the JIM, told the Security Council on 7 November 2017 that the JIM did not receive a single piece of evidence to support the claims that the Khan Shaykhun attack was staged. Russia and Syria had nearly six months to pass relevant information supporting their claims to the JIM.

- The JIM consulted experts from three independent, internationally recognized institutes about the crater left by the attack, and all three said that there was no evidence to support the theory that the crater was created by an explosive charge placed on the ground, as the Russians assert. Instead, experts concluded that the

characteristics of the crater are likely to have been caused by an aerial bomb with a small explosive charge, and that it probably contained liquid. According to the JIM munition analysis, there was a filler cap from a chemical munition and a deformed piece of metal protruding from deep within the crater, which is uniquely consistent with Syrian chemical aerial bombs.

- The Russians repeatedly state that the Syrian aircraft would not be technically capable of bombing Khan Shaykhun if the Syrian aircraft was more than 5 kilometres (km) away from Khan Shaykhun at the time of the attack. No one, however, has disputed this point. Indeed, the JIM report states that the Syrian aircraft were "in the immediate vicinity" or "within 5 km" of Khan Shaykhun, which the experts it consulted said was within range to conduct an airstrike on the town.

- Finally, the Russian Federation draws attention to the fact that sarin injuries were reported at hospitals near Khan Skaykhun prior to 4 April 2017. As noted by the JIM and reported by the FFM, sarin was more than likely also used as a chemical weapon nearby on 30 March 2017, in the south of al Latamenah, Syria. This chemical weapon attack explains earlier reporting of sarin injuries.

Russian allegation No. 7: *"Moscow believes that it makes no sense for Damascus to use chemical weapons as only the opposition could benefit from it."* (Statement by Russian Defense Ministry, Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Industry and Trade at press conference in Sputnik on 2 November 2017)

- False. The Syrian regime's repeated use of chemical weapons shows a pattern, illustrating it uses chemical weapons to obtain military aims that are otherwise proving difficult to achieve through conventional force. We believe the attack against Khan Shaykhun was launched in response to an opposition offensive in northern Hamah Province that threatened the Assad regime's infrastructure, including a key military airfield.

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Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 12 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to convey herewith the records of violations of the ceasefire by the Republic of Armenia in November and December 2017 (see annexes I and II).* During the two months of the reporting period, Armenia violated the ceasefire regime 3,716 and 4,014 times, respectively, and continued the use of large-calibre guns and heavy weaponry from its positions in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan and from its own territory.

As a result, one serviceman of the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan was wounded during two months.

The continuous occupation of a large part of the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the armed forces of Armenia remains the main obstacle in the settlement of the conflict and the only source of the escalation of the situation on the frontline and the occurrence of hostilities and casualties.

The sooner the Republic of Armenia withdraws its troops from the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the sooner peace and stability can be restored in the region.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35 and 40, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only.

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Annex I to the letter dated 12 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia for November 2017*

Dates	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Number of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damages*
1–30 November	**Aghdam district, Azerbaijan**			
	Afatly village	AK	18	
	Ahmadali village	AK/AKM	21	
	Ahmadaghali village	AK/AKM	60	
	Ayag Garvand village	AKM	17	
	Chamanly village	AK	50	
	Chiragly village	AK	62	
	Evoghlu village	AK	9	
	Mammadbaghirly village	AK/AKM	48	
	Mirashilly village	AK	40	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	95	
	Orta Garvand village	AK	45	
	Saryjaly village	AK/AKM	10	
	Yuzbashily village	AK	7	
	Zangishaly village	AK	54	
	Aghjabadi district, Azerbaijan			
	Gyamaddynly village	AK/AKM	123	
	Minakhorlu village	AK/AKM	29	
	Aghstafa district, Azerbaijan			
	Kohna Gyshlag village	AK/AKM	22	
	Beylagan district, Azerbaijan			
	Garadaghly village	AK	28	
	Dashkasan district, Azerbaijan			
	Alkhanchally village	AK/AKM	16	
	Opposite positions	AK	1	
	Tazakand village	AKM	3	
	Zivilyan village	AKM	28	
	Fizuli district, Azerbaijan			
	Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly village	AK/AKM	90	
	Alkhanly village	AK/AKM	53	
	Horadiz village	AK/AKM	91	

Abbreviations: AK, Kalashnikov assault rifle; AKM, modernized Kalashnikov assault rifle; DShK, heavy machine gun; OSV, semi-automatic sniper rifle; PKM, modernized Kalashnikov machine gun; RPG, hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher; 60-mm M, mortar.

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

Dates	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Number of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damages*
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	545	
	Shukurbayli village	AK/AKM	84	
	Gazakh district, Azerbaijan			
	Alibayramli village	AK	1	
	Ashaghi Askipara village	AKM	1	
	Bala Jafarli village	AK/AKM	36	
	Dashsalahli village	AKM	3	
	Farahli village	AK/AKM	20	
	Jafarli village	AK/AKM	13	
	Gaymagly village	AKM/DShK	30	
	Gushchu Ayrim village	AKM	19	
	Gyzylhajili village	AK/AKM	39	
	Kamarli village	AK/AKM/DShK	44	
	Mazam village	AKM	11	
	Musakoy village	AK/AKM	9	
	Shikhily village	AKM	1	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	2	
	Gedebey district, Azerbaijan			
	Dordlar village	AKM	2	
	Galakand village	AKM	5	
	Garavallar village	AKM	5	
	Gasimaghali village	AKM	22	
	Mutudara village	AKM/DShK	33	
	Novoivanovka village	AKM	15	
	Novosaratovka village	AKM	2	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	17	
	Zamanly village	AKM	29	
	Goranboy district, Azerbaijan			
	Borsunlu village	AK/AKM/RPG	93	
	Gargujag village	AKM	28	
	Gulustan village	AKM/DShK	74	
	Gyrmyzysaggallar village	AK/AKM	2	
	Kharkhaput village	AK/DShK	24	
	Opposite positions	DShK	29	
	Tapgaragoyunlu village	AK/AKM/DShK	96	
	Unnamed positions	AKM/DShK	34	
	Yenikand village	AK	49	
	Yukhari Agjakend village	AKM	2	
	Zeyva village	AK/AKM	36	
	Goygol district, Azerbaijan			
	Kurdalylar village	AKM/DShK	24	

Dates	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Number of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damages*
	Opposite positions	AKM	2	
	Pirverdilar village	PKM	19	
	Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan			
	Ahmadalılar village	AK	17	
	Chakhirli village	AK	7	
	Jojug Marjanli village	AK	41	
	Lala Ilahi heights	AK	49	
	Opposite positions	AKM	15	
	Khojavand district, Azerbaijan			
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	340	
	Unnamed heights	AK/AKM/PKM	2	
	Tartar district, Azerbaijan			
	Chayly village	AK/AKM	68	
	Damirchilar village	AK/AKM	14	
	Gapanly village	AK/AKM	88	
	Gaynag village	AK	3	
	Gazyan village	AK/AKM	20	
	Hasangaya village	AK/AKM	101	
	Husanli	AK	4	
	Jamilly village	AK	13	
	Karmiravan village	AK	36	
	Levonarkh village	AK	2	
	Seyidimli village	AKM	2	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM/DShK/60-mm M	156	
	Tazakand village	AK	16	
	Unnamed positions	AK	2	
	Tovuz district, Azerbaijan			
	Aghdam village	AKM/DShK/OSV	58	
	Aghbulag village	AK/AKM/DShK	7	
	Alibayli village	AKM	13	
	Garalar village	AK/DShK	14	
	Hajihasanli village	AKM	1	
	Kokhanaby village	AKM	43	
	Munjuglu village	AK/AKM	40	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	24	

Annex II to the letter dated 12 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia for December 2017*

Dates	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Number of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damages*
1–31 December	**Aghdam district, Azerbaijan**			
	Afatly village	AK	12	
	Ahmadali	AK	9	
	Ahmadaghali village	AK/AKM	63	
	Ayag Garvand village	AK/AKM	16	
	Chamanly village	AK/AKM	58	
	Chiragly village	AK/AKM	67	
	Evoghlu village	AK	4	
	Mammadbaghirly village	AK	49	
	Mirashilly village	AK/AKM	53	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM/DShK	109	
	Orta Garvand	AK/AKM	56	
	Saryjaly village	AK/AKM	10	
	Unnamed heights	AK	3	
	Yuzbashily village	AK/DShK	10	
	Zangishaly village	AK/AKM	70	
	Aghjabadi district, Azerbaijan			
	Gyamaddynly village	AK/AKM	106	
	Minakhorlu village	AK/AKM	36	
	Beylagan district, Azerbaijan			
	Garadaghly village	AK/AKM	32	
	Dashkasan district, Azerbaijan			
	Alkhanchally village	AKM/DShK	13	
	Opposite positions	AK	6	
	Tazakand village	AKM	13	
	Zivilyan village	AKM/DShK	17	
	Fizuli district, Azerbaijan			
	Abdurrahmanli village	AK/AKM	7	
	Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly village	AK/AKM	106	
	Alkhanly village	AK/AKM	53	
	Horadiz village	AK/AKM	79	

Abbreviations: AK, Kalashnikov assault rifle; AKM, modernized Kalashnikov assault rifle; DShK, heavy machine gun; PKM, modernized Kalashnikov machine gun; RPG, hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher.

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

Dates	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Number of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damages*
	Opposite positions	AK	552	
	Shukurbayli village	AK/AKM	78	
	Gazakh district, Azerbaijan			
	Alibayramly village	AKM	3	
	Bala Jafarli village	AKM/DShK	18	
	Farahli village	AK/AKM	30	
	Jafarli village	AKM	4	
	Gaymagly village	AKM/DShK	43	
	Gushchu Ayrim village	AKM	31	
	Gyzylhajili village	AK/AKM	37	
	Kamarli village	AK/AKM	48	
	Kohna Gyshlag village	AKM	40	
	Mazam village	AKM	6	
	Musakoy village	AK/DShK	17	
	Shikhly village	AK/AKM	9	
	Unnamed heights	AK	12	
	Gedebey district, Azerbaijan			
	Ayridara village	AKM	1	
	Daryurd village	AKM	4	
	Galakand village	AKM	11	
	Gasimaghali village	AKM	10	
	Mutudara village	AKM	22	
	Novoivanovka village	AKM	13	
	Novosaratovka village	AKM	1	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	11	
	Zamanly village	AKM	37	
	Goranboy district, Azerbaijan			
	Borsunlu village	AK/AKM/RPG	89	
	Gapanli village	AKM	32	
	Gulustan village	AKM/DShK	77	1 serviceman of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was wounded
	Kharkhaput village	AK	24	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	25	
	Tapgaragoyunlu village	AK/AKM/DShK/RPG	110	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	15	
	Unnamed positions	AKM	30	
	Yenikand village	AK/AKM	77	
	Yukhari Agjakend village	AKM	1	
	Zeyva village	AKM	45	

Dates	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Number of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damages*
	Goygol district, Azerbaijan			
	Azgilli village	AKM	1	
	Bash Gishlag village	AKM	1	
	Kurdalylar village	AKM/DShK	25	
	Opposite positions	AKM	1	
	Pirverdilar village	AK/AKM	14	
	Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan			
	Ahmadalilar village	AK	13	
	Jojug Marjanli village	AK	44	
	Lala Ilahi heights	AK/AKM	69	
	Opposite positions	AK	8	
	Khojavand district, Azerbaijan			
	Opposite positions	AKM/PKM	342	
	Unnamed heights	AK/AKM	10	
	Tartar district, Azerbaijan			
	Chayly village	AK/AKM	102	
	Damirchilar village	AK/AKM	19	
	Gapanly village	AK/AKM	113	
	Gaynag village	AK	2	
	Gazyan village	AK/AKM	18	
	Hasangaya village	AK/AKM	144	
	Husanli	AK	12	
	Huseynly village			
	Jamilly village	AK	16	
	Karmiravan village	AK	7	
	Levonarkh village	AK	5	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	164	
	Tazakand village	AK/AKM	11	
	Unnamed positions	AK/AKM	3	
	Tovuz district, Azerbaijan			
	Aghdam village	AK/AKM	69	
	Aghbulag village	AK/AKM/DShK	18	
	Alibayli village	AK/AKM	14	
	Asryk Jirdakhan village	AK	7	
	Garalar village	AKM	15	
	Hajaly village	AKM	4	
	Kokhanaby village	AKM/DShK	44	
	Munjuglu village	AK/AKM	71	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	8	

United Nations S/2018/37

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 January 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 11 January 2018 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to the letter dated 13 November 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Italy, Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi, I have the honour to inform you that the members of the Security Council have agreed to send a mission to Afghanistan from 12 to 15 January 2018. They have also agreed on the terms of reference of the mission (see annex).

I have the honour to lead this mission in my capacities as Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations and President of the Security Council for the month of January 2018.

Following consultations with the members, it has been agreed that the composition of the mission will be as follows:

Ambassador Sacha Sergio Llorentty Soliz (Bolivia (Plurinational State of))
Mr. Bo Shen (China)
Ambassador Bernard Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire)
Ambassador Anatolio Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea)
Ambassador Tekeda Alemu (Ethiopia)
Ms. Anne Gueguen (France)
Ambassador Kairat Umarov (Kazakhstan)
Ambassador Mansour Alotaibi (Kuwait)
Ambassador Karel van Oosterom (Netherlands)
Ambassador Gustavo Meza-Cuadra (Peru)
Ambassador Joanna Wronecka (Poland)
Mr. Vladimir Safronkov (Russian Federation)
Ambassador Olof Skoog (Sweden)
Ambassador Jonathan Guy Allen (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
Ambassador Nikki R. Haley (United States of America)

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kairat **Umarov**
President of the Security Council

18-00628 (E) 160118

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Annex

Terms of reference of the Security Council mission to Afghanistan

I. Context

1. The Security Council will carry out its mission to Afghanistan from 12 to 15 January 2018 within the context of and in line with the following:

(a) The relevant statements by the President of the Security Council on the situation in Afghanistan (S/PRST/2014/12 and S/PRST/2016/14);

(b) Security Council resolution 2344 (2017) on the situation in Afghanistan;

(c) The most recent report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security (S/2017/1056);

(d) The most recent report of the Secretary-General on the strategic review of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (S/2017/696);

(e) The eighth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2255 (2015) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan (see S/2017/409).

II. Objectives of the visit

2. The members of the mission will meet with representatives of the Government of Afghanistan, members of political parties and representatives of civil society and of UNAMA and the Resolute Support Mission. The main objectives of the mission are:

(a) To underscore that a conflict-free and violence-free Afghanistan is critical for regional and global peace and security;

(b) To reiterate the support of the Security Council for the Government and the people of Afghanistan and their efforts to rebuild their country, strengthen the foundations of sustainable peace and constitutional democracy and assume their place in the community of nations;

(c) To express strong support for UNAMA and its Head, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, in fulfilling their mandates as defined in resolution 2344 (2017);

(d) To review efforts by the Afghan authorities in support of an Afghan-led development and stabilization process, with the assistance of the international community, to address the instability caused by the Taliban, including the Haqqani Network, as well as the threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan and the region posed by Al-Qaida, ISIL (Da'esh) affiliates and other terrorist groups, violent and extremist groups, illegal armed groups, criminals and those involved in the narcotics trade, trafficking in persons and the diversion of chemical precursors;

(e) To underscore the importance of continued progress on electoral reform and towards the holding of credible and inclusive parliamentary elections in 2018 and presidential elections in 2019;

(f) To underline the importance of an inclusive Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process, in which women's participation is promoted at all levels, for the long-term prosperity and stability of Afghanistan;

(g) To review the progress made by the Afghan National Unity Government, with the assistance of the international community, including through capacity-building initiatives, in addressing interconnected challenges, including in the areas of security, economic and social development, governance, human rights and the rule of law, women's empowerment, regional cooperation and counter-narcotics;

(h) To encourage increased cooperation and coordination between Afghanistan and the Central Asian States, including in intergovernmental relations and people-to-people contacts;

(i) To encourage increased cooperation and coordination among UNAMA, the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia and relevant United Nations agencies and regional organizations to strengthen the region's capacity to overcome challenges to peace, stability and sustainable development, including with respect to the areas of counter-terrorism and combating cross-border organized crime, illicit drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, irregular migration and the use of the Internet for criminal purposes;

(j) To recognize that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing, to reaffirm the primary responsibility of the Government and the authorities of Afghanistan in identifying, driving and directing priorities, strategies and activities for sustaining peace, and in this regard, to emphasize that inclusivity, including by ensuring the full and effective participation of women, is key to advancing the peacebuilding process and objectives in Afghanistan in order to ensure that the needs of all segments of society are taken into account;

(k) To recognize the importance of linking security and development objectives, in order to achieve durable peace and prosperity in Afghanistan and in the wider region;

(l) To emphasize the importance of a regional approach to supporting security and prosperity in and around Afghanistan, and to underline the commitment of the Security Council to contributing constructively in this regard;

(m) To recommend a coordinated modus operandi for United Nations agencies and programmes to increase the effectiveness of the assistance provided by the United Nations on the ground, ensuring greater transparency in its administration, including in the implementation of anti-corruption measures, as well a more effective use of shrinking development and humanitarian aid, towards a harmonized United Nations approach in Afghanistan and Central Asian countries.

United Nations A/72/703–S/2018/58

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
16 January 2018

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 44
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instruction from my Government, I transmit herewith two documents detailing the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships (see annex II) during the month of November 2017. It should also be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the illegal airport of Tympou.

Furthermore, I wish to inform you that the occupation regime illegally issued seven notices to airmen relating to exercises conducted by the Turkish Air Force in November 2017.

Turkey's actions are clearly aimed at undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. In addition, Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) via radio calls. Meanwhile, Nicosia FIR infringements and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus continue unabated. Turkey's policy of persistently breaching international law and defying international rules and regulations puts the safety of international civil aviation at risk, has a negative impact on the stability of the region and causes difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus.

It should further be underlined that the continuation of Turkey's illegal actions creates tension during a critical period for the successful outcome of the ongoing negotiation process for a peaceful comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the continuing infringements of international air traffic regulations and the violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and appeal for their immediate cessation. The Republic of Cyprus reiterates, in this respect, its call for adherence to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

18-00724 (E) 260118

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I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kornelios **Korneliou**

Annex I to the letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 November	0921–0943	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC)
	0922–1355	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1127–1143	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
2 November	1305–1503	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
3 November	0600–0632	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1600–1830	One S-70 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
5 November	2154–2231	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
7 November	1343–1347	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1437–1513	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
8 November	1104–1123	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1420–1436	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
9 November	1657–1813	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
10 November	0430–0606	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1715–2105	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
11 November	1154–1657	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
12 November	0941–1313	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1025–1050	Two Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1050–1139	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1815–2004	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2212–0202	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
13 November	1024–1040	Two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1052–1113	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1132–1212	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1141–1233	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1208–1240	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1218–1248	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1249–1306	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1324–1339	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1504–1536	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1504–1536	One F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1530–1546	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
14 November	0934–0952	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0936–1005	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1054–1136	One F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1811–1827	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
15 November	0406–0539	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1034–1202	Five F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1115–1140	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1147–1230	One F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1541–1607	One F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2031–2035	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
16 November	1028–1242	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1044–1100	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1122–1142	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1208–1218	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1340–1355	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
17 November	0758–1006	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1203–1227	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1301–1309	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
18 November	0710–0753	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0720–0953	One S-70 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0825–1017	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
19 November	1134–1248	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
20 November	1704–1853	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
22 November	0948–1116	Two Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1017–1100	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2050–2113	One GLF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
23 November	0919–1334	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1018–1125	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1405–1545	One UH-1 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
24 November	0900–1313	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1402–1456	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
25 November	1305–1515	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
26 November	1231–1427	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1551–1631	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
27 November	0322–0343	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1406–1525	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1427–1515	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1500–1525	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
29 November	1133–1520	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
30 November	1053–1225	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1239–1356	One King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Annex II to the letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

Dates	*Nature of violation*
1–4 November	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
2–8 November	One NL-123 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
4–6 November	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
6–9 November	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
9 November	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
9–11 November	One P-338 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
10 November	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
12–14 November	One P-337 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
14–16 November	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
15–16 November	One F-394 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Keryneia while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
15–17 November	One S-359 Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Keryneia while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
16–24 November	One P-335 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces

Dates	*Nature of violation*
24 November	One P-331 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
27 November	One F-244 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces

United Nations S/2018/39

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 January 2018
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence on the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 11–15 January 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

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Annex to the letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (11 January 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported nine incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: four in Ladhiqiyah, two in Aleppo, two in Homs and one in Damascus.

The Turkish representative office has reported five incidents of gunfire: three in Aleppo Governorate and two in Damascus Governorate.

Most of the incidents of mortars and small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the Nusrah Front terrorist group.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation (delivery of food) in Ma'lula, Damascus Governorate, with a total cargo weight of 2.8 tons.

In total, 1,721 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,384.1 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 22 persons.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 67,975 persons.

The safe passage of one United Nations humanitarian convoy was assured to Tall Shihab in Dar'a Governorate. Food and essential items with a total cargo weight of 240 tons were delivered to the local population.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, one ceasefire regime agreement has been signed with Tarfawi in Aleppo Governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,325.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (12 January 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: three in Aleppo, two in Ladhiqiyah and one in Homs.

The Turkish representative office has reported three incidents of gunfire: two in Damascus Governorate and one in Homs Governorate.

Most of the incidents of mortars and small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the Nusrah Front terrorist group.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out two humanitarian operations: food with a total cargo weight of 2.6 tons was delivered to Khirbat Uqla in Aleppo Governorate; and food with a total cargo weight of 2.6 tons was delivered to Badu in Homs Governorate.

In total, 1,723 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,389.3 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 349 persons.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 68,324 persons.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,325.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (13 January 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported four incidents of gunfire: three in Aleppo Governorate and one in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported 11 incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: 6 in Damascus, 3 in Idlib and 2 in Hama.

Most of the incidents of mortar and small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the Nusrah Front terrorist group.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation (delivery of food) in Atshanat al-Mir, Aleppo Governorate, with a total cargo weight of 2.6 tons.

In total, 1,724 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,391.9 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 21 persons.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 68,345 persons.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, two ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with Abu Murayr in Aleppo Governorate and Humaymah in Homs Governorate.

The number of pacified areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,327.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (14 January 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported eight incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: four in Ladhiqiyah, three in Aleppo and one in Damascus.

Most of the incidents of mortar and small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the Nusrah Front terrorist group.

The Turkish representative office has reported no violations.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation in Qarfa, Dar'a Governorate. Food, Children's clothing and school supplies with a total cargo weight of 2.8 tons were delivered to the local population.

In total, 1,725 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,394.7 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 38 persons.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 68,383 persons.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire regime agreements have been signed with populated areas over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,327.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (15 January 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported five incidents of gunfire: three in Aleppo Governorate and two in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported four incidents of gunfire: three in Damascus Governorate and one in Dar'a Governorate.

Most of the incidents of mortars and small arms being fired indiscriminately have been reported in areas controlled by fighters of the Nusrah Front terrorist group.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out two humanitarian operations: food with a total cargo weight of 2.6 tons was delivered to the local population in Marrat, Dayr al-Zawr Governorate; and a total of 250 New Year gifts were distributed to orphaned children and children from low-income families in the Hannanu district, Aleppo City.

In total, 1,727 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,397.3 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 22 persons.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 68,405 persons.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, one ceasefire regime agreement has been signed with Hamdaniyah in Idlib Governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,328.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

United Nations S/2018/40

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 January 2018

Original: English

Seventeenth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2013)

I. Introduction

1. The present report, submitted pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 2107 (2103), covers developments pertaining to the issues of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property, including the national archives, since the issuance of my previous report, dated 19 October 2017 (S/2017/880).

2. Relations between Iraq and Kuwait continued to improve during the reporting period. The President of Iraq, Fuad Masum, made an official visit to Kuwait on 20 November 2017 in response to an official invitation from the Emir of the State of Kuwait, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah. This was the first visit to Kuwait by an Iraqi President in nine years. Discussions were focused on boosting bilateral relations in all fields and on the preparations for the international conference on the reconstruction of Iraq that Kuwait will host from 12 to 14 February 2018. Both sides agreed to pursue increased investment and economic opportunities, thereby further strengthening their ties. The decision, reached on 21 November by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission, concerning the resumption of deposits to the United Nations Compensation Fund and payments by the Government of Iraq towards the outstanding compensation awards also represents a positive step towards closer ties between Iraq and Kuwait.

II. Recent activities with regard to the repatriation and return of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals, or their remains

3. During the reporting period, the Ministry of Defence of Iraq continued to investigate a number of potential burial locations, including the Jahra', Sabahiah and naval base sites in Kuwait and the Radwaniyah, Suleimaniyah and Salman Pak sites in Iraq. As part of those efforts, the Ministry also followed up with witnesses, as well as with relevant government bodies, to verify all acquired information in an effort to identify exact burial locations. Furthermore, two new witnesses separately came forward with information on potential burial locations.

4. The Ministry of Defence of Iraq also continued to seek information from relevant government institutions in an effort to precisely determine the burial location at the Khamisiyah site. From 6 to 14 September and from 8 to 16 October 2017, the technical team of the Ministry undertook exploration and excavation work at the

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potential burial site in Khamisiyah, during which 183 and 210 trenches were dug, respectively. No human remains were found. The coordinates of areas covered by trenches were communicated to the members of the tripartite mechanism for their information.

5. From 15 to 18 September and from 18 to 21 October 2017, the technical team of the Ministry of Defence of Iraq also carried out exploration and excavation work at the potential burial location in Samawah District. A total of 183 trenches were dug, and six sites were identified. However, neither human remains nor grave-like features were found. The coordinates of areas covered by trenches were communicated to the members of the tripartite mechanism for their information.

6. From 23 to 28 September and from 22 to 28 October 2017, the technical team of the Ministry of Defence of Iraq carried out exploration and excavation work at the potential burial site in Karbala' Province, digging 125 and 160 trenches, respectively. The coordinates of the areas covered with 285 trenches were recorded and communicated to the members of the tripartite mechanism for their information. A total of 16 sites were identified during the work, but no human remains or grave-like features were found.

7. On 16 October 2017, the technical team of the Ministry of Defence of Iraq undertook exploration and excavation work at the potential burial site in Maysan Governorate, during which six trenches were dug. No human remains were located. The coordinates of areas covered by trenches were communicated to the members of the tripartite mechanism for their information.

8. On 24 October 2017, human remains were retrieved by the technical team of the Ministry of Defence of Iraq from a potential burial site in Basrah. The remains were handed over to the Medico-Legal Directorate. Corresponding forensic work of genetic profiling is ongoing.

9. Also during the reporting period, human remains were retrieved by the technical team of the Ministry of Defence of Iraq from a potential burial site in Najaf. The remains were handed over to the Medico-Legal Directorate. Corresponding forensic work of genetic profiling is ongoing.

10. On 30 October 2017, the Ministry of Defence of Iraq issued a broadcast on all available satellite TV channels, inviting those with information on missing Kuwaiti persons and missing Kuwaiti property to come forward.

11. On 12 November 2017 in Baghdad, my Deputy Special Representative for Iraq met with the Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegation in Iraq, Katharina Ritz, to discuss how the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) could best contribute to the missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals file.

12. In line with the recommendations made at the forty-fourth session of the Tripartite Commission, which are aimed at reaching out to other organizations and countries facing similar issues, on 13 November 2017 UNAMI, together with members of the tripartite mechanism, took part in a visit to Cyprus, organized by ICRC, to the Mia Milia excavation site, the premises of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus and the Committee's anthropological laboratory. The Committee was established to recover, identify and return to their families the remains of Turkish and Greek Cypriots who went missing during the intercommunal fighting of 1963 to 1964 and the events of 1974. The Committee's team provided an extensive overview of this bicommunal project, including its archaeological phase, related to the exhumation of the remains of missing persons; its anthropological phase, related to the analysis of the recovered remains at the Committee laboratory; its genetic phase, related to the DNA identification process; and its phase involving the identification

and return of remains, which includes the reconciliation of the information obtained in all previous phases and the formal identification and return of the identified remains to their families. A productive exchange of information and experiences took place between members of the tripartite mechanism and the Committee. The Iraqi delegation expressed keen interest in applying to its own work a number of the procedures, techniques and technologies used by the Committee.

13. On 14 November 2017 in Cyprus, UNAMI attended, in its observer capacity, the 101st session of the Technical Subcommittee of the tripartite mechanism. The Iraqi delegation expressed its commitment to continue its efforts until the file was fully resolved, despite the lack of tangible results over the past 13 years. The Kuwaiti delegation thanked the Ministry of Defence of Iraq for its activities and persistent efforts. The Iraqi delegation requested support for its field work to acquire expertise, as well as for the training of the Ministry of Defence technical team. Delegations of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and ICRC were also requested to study the maps of Khamisiyah that had been obtained in an effort to identify burial locations in that area, with the Kuwaiti delegation emphasizing the importance of also acquiring aerial photographs. In addition, the Kuwaiti delegation proposed that ICRC regularly update the Khamisiyah, Karbala' and Samawah sites through Google Earth to showcase all field activities. The proposal is currently under consideration.

14. During the session, a draft report on the ICRC review project was shared with all delegations, providing a historical overview of the tripartite mechanism, technical assessment and background with respect to each of the potential burial sites, and a series of findings and recommendations addressing the way forward. The members of the mechanism were invited to study the report and to provide their comments by the next session of the Technical Subcommittee, scheduled to be held in January 2018. The Iraqi and Kuwaiti delegations expressed their appreciation to the ICRC team for its work on the review project.

15. On 15 November 2017 in Cyprus, my Deputy Special Representative met with the Head of the technical committee in charge of the file on missing Kuwaiti persons at the Ministry of Defence of Iraq, Brigadier General Hazem Qassem Majid, who informed her that a special committee would be convened to examine in detail the draft report on the ICRC review project and provide feedback. He also expressed the hope that the project would provide specific indications of which potential burial locations should be prioritized and which should be closed, in order to guide the work of the Iraqi technical teams. In addition, the head of the committee identified the needs of the various institutions of the Government of Iraq contributing to the file, including the need for modern technology, field equipment, forensic training and capacity-building, particularly in the areas of DNA and anthropology, as well as for an increase in the storage capacity of the Medico-Legal Directorate. My Deputy Special Representative underlined the continued support of UNAMI for the Government of Iraq and a commitment to look carefully at where the United Nations could add value, drawing on existing expertise and resources within the Mission and more widely across the United Nations community.

16. On 15 November 2017 in Cyprus, my Deputy Special Representative also met with the Chair of the Kuwaiti National Committee for Missing Persons and Prisoners of War Affairs, Ibrahim Al-Shaheen, and the other members of the Committee. Mr. Al-Shaheen requested the support of UNAMI in obtaining both aerial photographs and satellite imagery of the Khamisiyah site and in reviewing the viability of using modern technology, such as ground-penetrating radar and metal detectors, on potential burial sites in Iraq. My Deputy Special Representative reaffirmed the determination of UNAMI to support the tripartite mechanism, guided by the recommendations set out in the draft report on the ICRC review project.

17. A UNAMI delegation, headed by my Deputy Special Representative, attended, in an observer capacity, the forty-fifth session of the Tripartite Commission, held in Cyprus on 16 November 2017. A constructive atmosphere prevailed during the session, with all delegations reaffirming their commitment to the humanitarian objective and underlining the importance of the ICRC review project in supporting the work of the tripartite mechanism. The observer status of UNAMI was extended during the session. My Deputy Special Representative reaffirmed the dedication of UNAMI to supporting the tripartite mechanism and, in particular, to facilitating the efforts of the Government of Iraq on this important humanitarian endeavour.

18. On 23 November 2017 in Baghdad, my Deputy Special Representative followed up in a meeting with the Minister of Defence of Iraq, Irfan Al-Hayali. Mr. Al-Hayali expressed his commitment to achieving progress in the search for the missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals, emphasizing that all the capabilities of the Ministry had been placed at the disposal of its technical committee in an effort to attain tangible results.

III. Recent activities with regard to the return of Kuwaiti property

19. During the reporting period, no progress was made with regard to the return of Kuwaiti property.

20. On 15 November 2017 in Cyprus, my Deputy Special Representative met with the Head of the Arab Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq, Saad M. Redha, who reaffirmed the commitment of the Government of Iraq to resolving the file and underlined the readiness of the Ministry to hand over a number of Kuwaiti books located in university libraries across Iraq. My Deputy Special Representative expressed the readiness of UNAMI to facilitate and observe the official handover of the Kuwaiti books.

IV. Observations

21. I welcome the efforts of both Iraq and Kuwait in overcoming a history of conflict and tragedy, while working to forge close ties. They serve as a model of good-neighbourly relations in the region. I am confident that the strong support and solidarity demonstrated by Kuwait, and the commitment shown by Iraq to its international and humanitarian obligations, will provide the impetus required to reach the full normalization of relations. With this in mind, I call on the Government of Iraq to continue its efforts to attain tangible progress on the file of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and missing Kuwaiti property, including the national archives.

22. I remain disappointed that, despite all efforts, the human cost of the first Gulf war still lingers, with families of the missing waiting for more than 26 years to discover the fate of their loved ones. Providing the answers to grieving families depends on steadfast commitment, action and the adoption of new and innovative ways to take the file forward. The Ministry of Defence of Iraq has undertaken exceptional proactive efforts in field missions and in the collection of information, for which it should be commended. While I urge the Ministry to continue in the same vein until it is able to obtain concrete results, I also encourage other Member States to look into ways to support these efforts, including through the procurement of field equipment, as well as the provision of forensic, DNA and anthropological training and capacity-building for the Iraqi technical teams. I also call on those Member States in possession of satellite imagery from 1990 and 1991 to provide analysis and

information to the Government of Iraq that could assist in the identification of burial locations.

23. I applaud the outstanding dedication, support and expertise of the members of the tripartite mechanism, under the able leadership of ICRC, who have guided efforts to locate and recover missing persons for more than two decades and have maintained positive momentum on this important work. I am particularly encouraged by the efforts of the United Kingdom and the United States in reviewing their military archives to obtain information that could assist in this quest, and remain hopeful that their search will yield results. I welcome the submission, during the most recent meeting of the Technical Subcommittee in Cyprus, of the draft report on the ICRC review project. I commend ICRC for undertaking a project of such magnitude and scale, which covered the compilation of extensive data. UNAMI will carefully study the document to determine how best to support the mechanism, drawing on its expertise and available resources. I am certain that, by working together and translating the recommendations of the project into a concrete plan of action, the tripartite mechanism will achieve concrete results, while providing valuable lessons for other contexts in which efforts to locate and identify missing persons are being planned.

24. I regret that no new developments took place with regard to the missing Kuwaiti property. I reiterate my calls for the Government of Iraq to put in place the logistical arrangements for the swift repatriation of the located Kuwaiti books. I also urge the Government of Iraq to explore new strategies to revive the search for the Kuwaiti national archives.

25. I reaffirm the unwavering commitment of my Special Representative and my Deputy Special Representative, as well as of the UNAMI staff, to continue to play an active role in this important humanitarian endeavour.

United Nations S/2018/41

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 January 2018
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I write regarding the completely untrue allegations contained in the identical letters dated 2 January 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations (S/2018/6), which alleges that United Arab Emirates aircraft have violated the airspace of Qatar.

The United Arab Emirates strongly condemns and rejects the baseless claims made by the Government of Qatar. It is regrettable and worrying that the Qatari Government has persisted in its irresponsible course of action, whose consequences are nefarious and detrimental to the interests of the States of the region and regional and international peace and security. The United Arab Emirates recalls that the principles of respect for sovereignty and good neighbourliness require States to refrain from fabricating incidents, scaremongering and distorting the facts.

Before addressing the substance of these false accusations, I should like to draw your attention to the discrepancies, inaccuracies and deliberate misrepresentation of international law and the unprofessional approach shown by the Qatari letters. Those attributes confirm our strong conviction that the accusations are mendacious and fabricated.

For example, the letters contained in document S/2018/6 misrepresent the laws and principles that the Qatari Government seeks to invoke. The United Arab Emirates stresses that the relevant customary international law is codified in paragraph 1 of article 58 (Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone) and article 87 (Freedom of the high seas) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The existence of an exclusive economic zone does indeed grant coastal states certain rights of an economic nature, such as the exploitation of the seabed of the area and some priority with regard to fishing. However, all States in the exclusive economic zone enjoy the freedoms granted by international law in the high seas, including the freedom of navigation and the freedom of overflight without prior notice or authorization from the coastal State.

It follows that the activities of the United Arab Emirates in the aforementioned exclusive economic zone, to which the identical letters from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations refer, took place in exercise of the freedom of overflight over the high seas, which does not affect or conflict with the economic rights guaranteed under international law to the coastal State of the exclusive economic zone, and does not mean that the United Arab Emirates has

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violated the sovereignty of Qatar. Accordingly, Qatar's claims are false and its conduct inappropriate.

In order to set out the facts, I have the honour to enclose herewith two reports issued by the Air Operations Command, Headquarters of the Air Force and Air Defence, General Headquarters of the Armed Forces, along with their annexes. Report 1 shows the route of the F-16 aircraft (serial number 0403), which, according to the letter from the Qatari Government contained in document S/2018/6, violated the airspace of Qatar by flying over its exclusive economic zone. As indicated in report 1, the aircraft was on a training mission within a United Arab Emirates' military training area D/EU-2. During the training mission, the aircraft flew for one minute over the international waters controlled by the Bahrain Area Control Centre (see annex E of report 1). Annex A of report 1 indicates that the manoeuvre area of that aircraft was within a United Arab Emirates training area (OMR-54). It shows the aircraft's path, confirming that it flew over international waters for one minute. The other annexes of report 1 display the path, coordinates and timings of the aircraft, which show that it never approached Qatari airspace or came close to the area of the Qatari marine firing range (OTD-28). The latter is monitored by Bahrain's regional radar from an altitude of 24,000 feet and above. Although the aircraft did not enter the firing range, its altitude was 33,400 feet, i.e. within the area controlled by the regional radar of Bahrain. All claims made by Qatar are therefore fabricated and unfounded.

Report 2 and its annexes describe an incident that took place on 27 December 2017, in which Qatari combat aircraft intercepted two United Arab Emirates aircraft (CASA CN-235 numbers 812 and 813), and sent out a call to three other United Arab Emirates aircraft (an Avanti, a C-17 and a C-130) to move away from Qatari territorial waters, even though those aircraft were north of and outside the territorial waters of Qatar and within Bahraini airspace on that date. Report 2 details a number of serious violations committed by Qatar, which require urgent consideration:

1. A call was sent out to the aircraft while they were landing at Isa Air Base and were in contact with air control within the Bahrain airspace.

2. The aircraft were intercepted while following international airways approved by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

3. Qatari regime combat aircraft came within 100 feet of the United Arab Emirates aircraft, causing a threat to air safety.

Lastly, the United Arab Emirates recalls that the collective measures taken by countries that are committed to maintaining the safety and stability of the region were taken in order to urge the Government of Qatar to reconsider its policies and its provocative positions, and to call on Qatar to respect its international obligations, including regional and international treaties, in the hope that Qatar would show a genuine commitment to the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Saud Hamad Ghanem Hamad **Alshamsi**
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex to the letter dated 15 January 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Report 1

Confidential

Ref.: *qaf-jim-dal*/*qaf-'ayn-jim*/*'ayn* 143
21 Rabi' II, A.H. 1439 (8 January, A.D. 2018)

Joint Operations Centre/Current Operations Unit

Subject: Letter of protest from Qatar

Re: your letter *mim-'ayn-shin*/*shin-'ayn-jim*/*'ayn* 143/35 of 7 January 2018

1. Enclosed herewith are annexes A, B, C, D and E, displaying the route of the F-16 aircraft (serial number 0403) which Qatar claims violated its airspace and flew over its exclusive economic zone at 33,400 feet and a speed of 460 knots for one minute without the prior knowledge of the Qatari authorities.

2. Qatar claims that the training mission of the above-mentioned aircraft constitutes a flagrant violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The truth is that the above aircraft was on a training mission within United Arab Emirates military training area D/EU-2 and, for one minute, flew over international waters in the area controlled by the Bahrain Area Control Centre, as shown in annex E.

3. Annex A makes it clear that the manoeuvre area of that aircraft is within training area OMR-54 of the United Arab Emirates. The flight path shows that it flew over international waters for only one minute. The other annexes show the flight path, coordinates and timings of the United Arab Emirates aircraft. These show that the aircraft never approached the airspace of Qatar or came close to the area of the marine firing range of Qatar (OTD-28). That area is controlled by the Bahrain Area Control Centre from an altitude of 24,000 feet. Although the United Arab Emirates aircraft did not enter that firing range, it was in any event flying at an altitude of 33,400 feet, i.e. within the area under the control of the Bahrain Area Control Centre. It follows that all of the claims made by Qatar are fabricated and without basis.

4. The foregoing is provided for your information.

Brigadier General Hilal Sa'id Hilal **al-Qubaysi**
Acting Commander of Air Operations

Annexes: A through E

Copied: Office of the Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence, for information

Operations and Training Department

Annex A


Air navigation area controlled by Bahrain
Air navigation area controlled by the United Arab Emirates
Boundaries of United Arab Emirates training area OMR-54
Qatari marine firing range OTD-28
Manoeuvre area of the aircraft
Boundaries of the sovereign airspace of Qatar

Annex B of our letter *qaf-jim-dal/qaf-'ayn-jim/'ayn* 143 dated 8 January 2018

Flight vs. OTD-28



Annex C of our letter *qaf-jim-dal/qaf-'ayn-jim/'ayn* 143 dated 8 January 2018

Flight vs. OTD-28



Annex D of our letter *qaf-jim-dal/qaf-'ayn-jim/'ayn* 143 dated 8 January 2018

Flight path

	Coordinates	Time	Level
Exit from OMR54	244453N 0515811E	06:53:09	FL334
Furthers point out of OMR54	244832N 0520123E	06:53:50	FL327



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Annex E of our letter *qaf-jim-dal/qaf-'ayn-jim/'ayn* 143 dated 8 January 2018

سـري

Flight Vs Qatar Territorial water
Source: ICAO
2015 12 June
FIR WORLD
Software
ArcGIS online
Viewer

Report 2

Confidential

Air Force and Air Defence

Air Operations Command

Operations and Training Department

Report on aerial interception carried out by Qatari combat aircraft on 27 December 2017

1. General comments: The air forces of the Qatari regime intercepted two United Arab Emirates aircraft (CASA CN-235 serial numbers 812 and 813 respectively), and sent out a call to three other United Arab Emirates aircraft (an Avanti, a C-17 and a C-130) to move away from Qatari territorial waters, even though the aircraft were in Bahraini airspace, north of and outside the territorial waters of Qatar.

2. Sequence of events:

(a) The C-130 aircraft (call sign 1733): The aircraft took off at 0502Z hours from Al-Reef airport, on the United Arab Emirates-Bahrain airway. During its landing and final approach to Isa Airbase, the Qatar air controller sent out a call to the aircraft to exit Qatari airspace and instructed it to turn right and head north. The pilot then contacted the Bahraini air controller and informed him of the incident. The Bahraini air controller confirmed to the pilot that he was in Bahraini airspace. The pilot also used the gauges of the aircraft to check that his location was 12 nautical miles from Isa Airbase. The aircraft proceeded to land at the airbase.

(b) The CASA CN-235 aircraft (serial number 812, call sign 1753): The aircraft took off at 0524Z hours from Al-Reef airport on the United Arab Emirates-Bahrain-Sharurah airway at 16,000 feet. It exited United Arab Emirates airspace at 0605Z hours. A review of the radar images shows that two armed Mirage 2000 aircraft (call signs 2340 and 2341) took off from Al-U deid Airbase. The first took off at 0610Z hours, the second at 0612Z hours. The distance between the two combat aircraft was approximately 30 nautical miles. After they took off, the Qatari air controller send out a call to the United Arab Emirates aircraft instructing it to move away from the territorial waters of Qatar. At the time it was intercepted, at 0618Z, the United Arab Emirates aircraft was at coordinates 25.52.34.00 N, 52.15.02.00 E, within Bahraini airspace in international waters on airway ORMID-UP699-SOGAT. The Qatari combat aircraft came within 100 feet of the United Arab Emirates aircraft, causing a serious threat to air navigation. Owing to the close distance, the pilot of United Arab Emirates aircraft was able to note the serial number of the Qatari combat aircraft (QA96) and documented it through video recording. The Qatari combat aircraft continued manoeuvring around the United Arab Emirates aircraft in a dangerous manner in order to drive it north, further from Qatari territorial waters. The pilot of the United Arab Emirates aircraft informed the Bahraini air controller of the incident. The latter instructed him to change his direction 15 degrees to the right, towards the north, in order to move away from Qatari territorial waters. However, the Qatari combat aircraft continued to manoeuvre around the United Arab Emirates aircraft until it arrived at coordinates 26.26.42.00 N, 51.16.43.00 E at 0638Z hours. The interception by the Qatari combat aircraft continued for 20 minutes. The pilot of the United Arab Emirates aircraft tried to contact the two Qatari combat aircraft several times through the emergency international frequency, urging them to keep their distance; but his call went unanswered.

(c) The CASA CN-235 aircraft (serial number 813, call sign 1754): The aircraft took off at 0543Z hours from Al-Reef airport on the United Arab Emirates-Jordan airway at 16,000 feet. It exited United Arab Emirates airspace at 0625Z hours. A review of the radar images shows that after the Qatari combat aircraft intercepted the first United Arab Emirates Aircraft, CASA CN-235 (serial number 812), they also intercepted the second United Arab Emirates aircraft, CASA CN-235 (serial number 813), at 0644Z hours at coordinates 26.16.42.00 N, 52.00.25.00 E, while it was within Bahraini airspace over international waters and on an international airway. The Qatari combat aircraft came within one nautical mile of the United Arab Emirates aircraft and continued to manoeuvre around it in order to drive it north, further from Qatari territorial waters. The Bahraini air controller informed the pilot of the United Arab Emirates aircraft that Qatari combat aircraft were approaching his aircraft and instructed him to change his direction 20 degrees to the right, towards the north, in order to move away from Qatari territorial waters. However, the two Qatari combat aircraft continued to manoeuvre around the United Arab Emirates aircraft until it reached coordinates 26.28.57.00 N, 51.13.06.00 E, at 0701Z hours. The interception by Qatari combat aircraft continued for 17 minutes, after which the combat aircraft returned to Al-Udaid airbase, where they landed at 0718Z hours.

(d) The Avanti aircraft (serial number 1207, call sign 3436): The aircraft took off at 0627Z hours from Al-Bateen airport on the United Arab Emirates-Ha'il-Cairo route at 30,000 feet. It exited United Arab Emirates airspace at 0653Z hours. After it had entered Bahraini airspace, the Bahraini air controller informed the pilot that Qatari combat aircraft had intercepted the United Arab Emirates CASA CN-235 aircraft (serial number 813), and instructed him to change his direction 10 degrees to the right, towards the north, in order to move away from Qatari territorial waters. A review of the radar images shows that no attempt was made to intercept the aircraft, as the two Qatari combat aircraft were by then returning to Al-Udeid Airbase. The Qatari air controller sent out a call to the United Arab Emirates aircraft instructing it to move away from Qatari territorial waters. The aircraft continued its flight to its planned destination.

(e) Aircraft C-17 (serial number 1225): The aircraft took off at 0755Z hours from Al-Reef airport on the United Arab Emirates-Ha'il-Cairo airway at 24,000 feet. After it had entered Bahraini airspace, the Bahraini air controller instructed the United Arab Emirates pilot to change his direction by 10 degrees in order to avoid Qatari airspace as a precautionary measure in view of the previous interception. However, the Qatari air controller sent out a call to the United Arab Emirates aircraft instructing it to move away from Qatari territorial waters. The pilot informed the Bahraini air controller, who directed him to turn another 10 degrees to the right, towards the north. The aircraft continued its flight to its planned destination.

(f) This sequence of events leads to the conclusion that the Qatari regime has been seeking to intercept our aircraft in furtherance of its aggressive stance towards the States that have imposed an embargo on it.

3. Violations committed by the Qatari regime:

(a) Qatar sent out calls to aircraft while they were landing at Isa Airbase and while they were in contact with air control in Bahraini airspace.

(b) Qatar intercepted our aircraft using armed Mirage 2000-5 aircraft while flying on ICAO-approved international airways.

(c) The Qatari regime combat aircraft came within 100 feet of United Arab Emirates aircraft, causing a threat to air safety.

4. Conclusion:

(a) Our aircraft complied with the designated and customary flight path, in accordance with the flight plan that had been sent in advance to ICAO. However, the Qatari regime endangered the safety of our aircraft by intercepting them with armed combat aircraft.

(b) The Qatari regime attempted to interfere with and intercept our aircraft under the pretext that they entered its territorial waters. That pretext is spurious: all of the interceptions took place far from the Qatari coasts at a distance not less than 30 nautical miles. Furthermore, by coming within 100 feet of the United Arab Emirates aircraft, the Qatari aircraft caused a threat to air safety, particularly as those actions took place over international waters and within Bahraini airspace.

(c) Based on the sequence of events and timing, and upon review of all the available information, it can be concluded that the incident was premeditated by the Qatari regime. This shows that the Qatari regime intended to escalate the situation, particularly in the light of embargo.

Annex A to the report on aerial interception carried out by Qatari combat aircraft on 27 December 2017

Map showing the major event locations


1. Point at which our aircraft left our airspace
2. Location of Al Udeid Air Base
3. Location of interception of CASA aircraft flight 812
4. Endpoint of interception of CASA aircraft flight 812
5. Location of interception of CASA aircraft flight 813
6. Endpoint of interception of CASA aircraft flight 813

Annex B to the report on aerial interception carried out by Qatari combat aircraft on 27 December 2017

Photograph taken by the captain of the Emirates aircraft showing how close the Qatari combat aircraft came to our aircraft



Armed Qatari Mirage 2000-5 aircraft


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United Nations S/2018/42

Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2367 (2017)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2367 (2017), in which the Secretary-General was requested to report every three months on progress made towards fulfilling the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). The report covers key developments relating to Iraq and provides an update on the activities of the United Nations in Iraq since my previous report, which was issued on 19 October 2017 (S/2017/881), and the briefing of my Special Representative for Iraq to the Council on 22 November 2017.

II. Summary of key political developments pertaining to Iraq

A. Political situation

2. On 9 December 2017, the Prime Minister of Iraq, Haider al-Abadi, declared final victory over Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The following day was declared an official holiday and a military parade was held in Baghdad to mark the victory. Mr. Al-Abadi said that Iraqi security forces had cleared out the remaining ISIL strongholds and raised the Iraqi flag in the western areas of Anbar Governorate, which had been the last remaining territory under the group's control. The flag flew high over all of Iraq and in most remote border areas, he said. He congratulated the Iraqi people and expressed gratitude to the families of those killed in action. He said that Iraq would continue to better the lives of its citizens, with respect for the religious, ethnic and ideological diversity of the country.

3. Mr. Al-Abadi said that the Iraqis had prevailed over terror through their unity, which should be strengthened by every means possible. He urged all politicians to refrain from inflammatory or sectarian speech, which had been a major cause of the emergence of ISIL. He emphasized that Iraq was for all Iraqis and that everyone was entitled to reap the benefits of security, stability, reconstruction and economic prosperity. The Government would endeavour to rebuild all cities in the liberated areas and southern governorates.

4. Mr. Al-Abadi saluted the members of all branches of the Iraqi security forces, including the army, police, air force, intelligence services, counter-terrorism services and popular mobilization forces, and also later mentioned the Peshmerga. He lauded the "historic fatwa" issued by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, which had resulted in

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the largest-ever voluntary campaign in support of the armed forces, transforming the fight against terrorism into an all-out national battle. Mr. Al-Abadi praised the tribal fighters and inhabitants of the territory occupied by ISIL who had cooperated with the security forces to liberate their lands and expressed gratitude to the countries and humanitarian organizations that had stood by Iraq.

5. Mr. Al-Abadi underlined the need for vigilance and preparedness to confront terrorist activity targeting the people or the country. He labelled terrorism a permanent enemy, underscoring that the battle must continue. He also said that the fight against corruption was a natural extension of the liberation operations and another battle in which everyone should participate.

6. The victory announcement was welcomed by Iraqi leaders, who emphasized the need for the reconstruction of the liberated areas, the return of displaced persons, measures to counter extremist ideologies and national reconciliation. It was also hailed by the representative of Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani, Ayatollah Abdul Mahdi al-Karbala'i, who nevertheless said in his sermon on 15 December that victory did not mean the end of the fight against terrorism. He called for efforts to address the intellectual and religious roots of terrorism, improve living conditions in the liberated areas and enable the dignified return of displaced persons. He stressed that the erosion of constitutional rights and a repetition of past mistakes should be avoided.

7. Ayatollah Karbala'i said that the Iraqi security system still needed many of the volunteers from the popular mobilization forces, who should continue to participate in the maintenance of security within the constitutional and legal frameworks that confined the use of arms to the State. The Government should provide a decent living for the families of those who had been killed and wounded in combat. He warned against exploiting the good reputation of the popular mobilization forces for political ends and emphasized the importance of a serious and effective effort to confront corruption.

8. Ayatollah Karbala'i's statement was preceded by statements from various factions of the popular mobilization forces. On 11 December, Muqtada al-Sadr stated that the Peace Brigades would be transformed into a civil organization and called upon the group's members to hand liberated areas over to the Iraqi security forces within 45 days. On 13 December, the Secretary-General of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Qais al-Khaz'ali, announced that his group would become a political entity and sever ties with its fighters, who had been transferred to the popular mobilization forces. Both men were adamant that members of the popular mobilization forces could not participate in the political process. The Secretary-General of the Badr Organization, Hadi al-Amiri, called upon the leaders of its affiliated brigades to cut their ties with the brigades and comply with the orders of the Prime Minister, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief.

9. On 21 November, Mr. Al-Abadi announced renewed efforts to tackle corruption. He indicated that the Supreme Council for Combating Corruption was following up on investigations of individuals inside and outside Iraq. The Council, which was established in October 2015 and is chaired by the Prime Minister, met on 4 December to discuss the performance of the General Inspectorate's offices in investigating cases. The following day, Mr. Al-Abadi reaffirmed that countering corruption was a judicial issue and that his Government aimed to achieve justice through due legal diligence.

10. In a related development, on 20 November, the Speaker of the Council of Representatives (the parliament), Salim al-Jubouri, announced that the Council would question ministers, including the Minister of Communications, the Minister of Education, the Minister of Electricity and the Minister of Migration and Displaced Persons, regarding allegations of corruption. On 28 November, the Minister of Communications, Hassan al-Rashid, was questioned.

11. At the local level, several elected officials have been removed from office. On 23 October, the head of the Security Committee of Basrah Provincial Council, Jabbar al-Saadi, was arrested on corruption charges. On 1 November, the Governor of Ninawa, Nawfal al-Akoub, was removed from office in absentia by the Provincial Council over corruption allegations. He was reinstated on 29 November, after the Ninawa Administrative Court annulled the Council's decision. On 21 November, the former Governor of Baghdad and member of the Islamic Da'wah Party, Salah Abdul Razzaq, was excluded from the party owing to corruption allegations.

12. On 31 October, the Council of Ministers issued Decision No. 347, officially setting 15 May 2018 as the date for elections to the Council of Representatives. It indicated that the federal Government would ensure a safe environment for the elections and facilitate the return of displaced persons. On 21 November, Mr. Al-Abadi said that the elections were a constitutional requirement and that no institution had the authority to delay them. He acknowledged the importance of enabling displaced persons to cast their votes and called upon voters to participate in the electoral process. On 22 November, the Independent High Electoral Commission sent a letter to the Speaker of the Council of Representatives requesting that: the elections be held on 12 May 2018, in order to prevent an overlap with the beginning of Ramadan; potential amendments to the electoral law be passed by the Council of Representatives by 20 December; the Council of Ministers authorize holding elections to the provincial and district councils and the Council of Representatives concurrently; and the Commission's budget be approved by 15 December. In response, the Council of Ministers amended its decision on 5 December and set the election date for 12 May 2018. The adoption of amendments to the Law on Elections to the Council of Representatives (Law No. 45 of 2013) and the Law on Provincial and District Council Elections (Law No. 36 of 2008), as well as the draft budget law of 2018 (and therefore the Commission's budget), remains pending.

13. Since the announcement of the election date, several members of the Council of Representatives have voiced concern that the current situation is not conducive to elections. On 4 November, a member of the Iraqi Forces Coalition, Ahmad al-Masari, said that conditions in the liberated areas needed to be improved and the return of displaced persons facilitated before elections were held. On 22 November, the Vice-President, Osama al-Nujaifi, said through social media that the success of the elections would depend on the reconstruction and stability of the liberated areas, the return of displaced persons and the withdrawal of armed groups from those areas. In a televised interview on 9 December, the Speaker of the Council of Representatives expressed support for holding the elections, provided that the environment was conducive to them and the necessary preparations had been completed. On 13 December, the Chair of the Council of Representatives Committee on Migration and Displaced Persons, Raad al-Dahlaki, called upon the Government and the United Nations to focus on ensuring the return of displaced persons, providing them with a safe environment and rebuilding their cities before defining timelines for elections.

14. Deadlines for the registration of political parties and coalitions were set for 25 December 2017 and 7 January 2018, respectively. On 25 November, the National Security Adviser, Faleh al-Fayyad, held a press conference to announce the formation of the Ata' party. Two days later, Mr. Al-Amiri announced his intention to run on an independent list for the elections. On 2 December, a spokesperson for the Sadrist Trend, Salah al-Obaidi, announced that Mr. Al-Sadr would run on a separate list, independently from the Ahrar bloc. On 12 December, the Chair of the State of Law Coalition, Nouri al-Maliki, told the media that the ruling Islamic Da'wah Party would have two separate lists in the elections.

15. The late submission of the draft federal budget law for 2018 to the Council of Representatives by the Council of Ministers on 29 November obliged the Speaker of

the Council of Representatives to call for an extraordinary parliamentary session on 2 December, which, however, was not held as a quorum could not be achieved. The draft has led to controversy among Kurdish members of the Council of Representatives and the Iraqi Forces Coalition over alleged reductions in budget share allocated to the Kurdistan region of Iraq and to the reconstruction of liberated areas, respectively.

16. On 17 December, the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Nechirvan Barzani, formally requested the Kurdistan Regional Parliament to expedite preparations for the regional parliamentary and presidential elections, to be held within three months. Several parties, including the Movement for Change (Gorran) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, have previously expressed concerns about the process of updating the voter registry. In the meantime, the latter has embarked on internal discussions about its next party congress, following the death of its leader and former President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani.

17. Dire economic conditions in the Kurdistan region of Iraq have led to widespread protests in Sulaymaniyah Governorate. On 19 December, the protests turned violent as demonstrators attacked the offices of political parties and public buildings. Casualties, including deaths, were reported in Raniya and Jamjamal. The leader of the New Generation Movement, Shaswar Abdulwahid, was arrested and his media outlet suspended by the authorities for alleged incitement to violence. On 21 December, Mr. Barzani issued a statement in which he stressed the natural right of the people to demonstrate peacefully but condemned the use of violence.

18. Amid the protests, the Movement for Change and the Kurdistan Islamic Group announced their withdrawal from the Kurdistan Regional Government, citing the need to disband the Cabinet, given the political and economic situation. The Movement for Change also decided to abandon its claim to holding the position of Speaker of the Kurdistan Regional Parliament, which it had maintained since October 2015, when the then Speaker, who was affiliated to the Movement, was prevented from entering Erbil.

B. Relations between Baghdad and Erbil

19. The federal Government continued to demand the restoration of full federal authority over all disputed areas in and oil exports from the Kurdistan region of Iraq and the country's external border crossings located within the region, including the two international airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. In addition, Baghdad continued to insist that the Kurdistan Regional Government should annul the results of the referendum of 25 September as a sign that Erbil abided by the ruling of 20 November of the federal Supreme Court that the referendum was unconstitutional and its results invalid.

20. The Kurdistan Regional Government repeatedly affirmed its respect for the Constitution of Iraq and the ruling of the federal Supreme Court. It insisted, however, that annulling the results of the referendum was beyond its powers, given that they expressed the will of the Kurdish people. The former President of the Kurdistan region of Iraq, Masoud Barzani, who remains the head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, maintained that the referendum was a major achievement for the Kurdish people that could not be undone.

21. Control over the disputed areas and border crossings, including with the Syrian Arab Republic at Fish Khabour and with Turkey at Ibrahim Khalil, remains a source of tension. The positions of the Iraqi security forces and the Peshmerga in the disputed areas remain largely unchanged. No technical negotiations have been held between military officials from the federal and Kurdistan Regional Governments since the end

of October 2017, and an uneasy, informal truce has taken effect in place of a formal agreement.

22. Consideration of the draft federal budget law of 2018 has also affected relations between Baghdad and Erbil. On 2 December, the five main political parties in the Kurdistan region of Iraq sent a letter to Mr. Al-Abadi outlining their concerns, including with regard to the planned reductions in the share of revenues allocated to the Kurdistan region of Iraq, the calculation and management of sovereign expenses, the Peshmerga payments and budget allocations in the liberated areas, the region's share of international loans to Iraq and budget allocations to the Halabja local government. Meanwhile, Mr. Al-Abadi reiterated on 5 December that federal funding for the salaries of State employees in the Kurdistan region of Iraq would not be provided until the conclusion of an ongoing audit.

23. In a related development, the federal Supreme Court ruled on 27 November that sitting members of the Council of Representatives enjoyed parliamentary immunity and could be prosecuted only if accused of a felony and only then after their immunity had been lifted by the Council. As a consequence, on 28 November, all 14 Kurdish members, whom the Council had considered referring to the judiciary for their participation in the referendum held in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, resumed their parliamentary functions.

24. On 23 November, the President of Iraq, Fuad Masum, announced the formation of a committee to investigate violations of the Constitution committed since 2005. He travelled to Sulaymaniyah, Erbil and Kirkuk from 25 to 29 November in order to promote dialogue between Baghdad and Erbil and make progress on normalizing the situation in Kirkuk. He stressed the importance of reactivating the Kirkuk Provincial Council and electing a new Governor. It has been widely reported that the President sent letters to Mr. Al-Abadi and Mr. Barzani, as well as to international partners, on 18 December, calling upon them to join efforts in uniting the nation and improving relations between Baghdad and Erbil. In Kirkuk, the Provincial Council has not been able to convene since 28 November owing to the absence of a quorum. On 21 November, the Council held its first meeting since federal authority was restored in Kirkuk on 16 October, with 22 out of 41 members participating. The Council rejected calls for its dissolution and agreed to consider a proposal for the dismissal of its acting Chair, Rebwar Talabani. On 28 November, the Council reportedly met only to approve the payment of its members' salaries. The acting Chair remains in Erbil, citing security concerns. The impasse has affected the appointment of a new Governor in Kirkuk and the Deputy Governor, Rakan al-Jubouri, has been acting Governor since 16 October.

C. Security

25. Between 23 and 27 November, Iraqi security forces launched a military offensive in central northern Iraq, focused on clearing remnants of ISIL from the Jazirah desert expanse straddling the Governorates of Anbar, Salah al-Din and Ninawa. An area of 14,000 km^2 was cleared and 175 villages in the Jazirah and upper Euphrates areas were liberated. On 26 November, a separate operation began in the Wadi Hawran region in central Anbar, aimed at sealing off escape routes for ISIL from ongoing operations to the north. The conclusion of the larger Anbar military operation was announced on 9 December, although mopping-up operations continue in the north-west of Anbar. The declaration of victory was announced along with the liberation of large swathes of land in western Iraq. Overall, the Iraqi forces have liberated areas in which more than 4.5 million Iraqis live and over 135,200 km^2 of territory. The Government, however, continues to see the possibility of ISIL regrouping and an increase in asymmetric attacks as a major threat to the population.

26. Baghdad continues to experience more improvised explosive device and vehicle bomb attacks perpetrated by ISIL and targeting security forces and civilians than any other centre. A total of 124 attacks with improvised explosives took place between 22 November and 19 December, resulting in the deaths of 60 civilians. On 27 November, a double suicide attack in a market in Nahrawan, east of Baghdad, left more than 20 civilians dead and 30 wounded.

27. On 10 December, two children were reportedly killed and seven other persons injured by a mortar attack on a majority Turkmen area in the Tuz Khurmatu district of Salah al-Din Governorate. On 12 December, mortar attacks in the same area reportedly left 2 persons dead and 20 wounded. According to Kurdish media, the attacks were launched by Sunni and/or Kurdish militant groups operating from the mountainous eastern half of the district. According to the same media, Iraqi military helicopters responded by targeting the villages of Dawudah and Zinzana. On 14 December, other Kurdish media reported the deployment of Peshmerga forces in the area, aimed at closing a security void.

28. The Turkish armed forces reportedly continued strikes against alleged Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) targets. On 28 November, Turkish media reported that the Turkish air force had destroyed 41 PKK targets inside the Kurdistan region of Iraq, killing a number of PKK fighters. According to Kurdish media (Rudaw), the Turkish air force carried out additional air strikes in the Kurdistan region of Iraq on 3 and 11 December. No casualties were reported.

D. Regional and international developments

29. International and regional partners have congratulated the people and Government of Iraq for their victory over ISIL. Key messages were delivered on the need to ensure that the fight against terrorism in Iraq continues and that decisive steps are taken to rebuild liberated areas, strengthen the capacity of Iraqi institutions, promote national reconciliation and prioritize efforts to combat corruption.

30. The Government continued to enhance its cooperation with the international community. On 29 November, Mr. Al-Abadi met the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Theresa May, in Baghdad. He explained that the current focus for Iraq was reconstruction and investment efforts and thanked his counterpart for the support of the United Kingdom in the fight against terrorism. Ms. May reaffirmed support for the unity of Iraq. On 11 and 12 December, Mr. Al-Abadi attended the One Planet Summit on climate change, in Paris, where he stated that, following the defeat of ISIL, Iraq would fight corruption, which endangered stability and hampered development. He also met, separately, the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Taro Kono, the President of the World Bank Group, Jim Yong Kim, and myself, and discussed the victory against ISIL, reconstruction and economic reform.

31. On 2 December, Mr. Barzani met Mr. Macron in Paris. Mr. Macron called upon him and Mr. Al-Abadi to initiate a constructive dialogue for Iraqi unity. On 17 December, Mr. Barzani and the Deputy Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Qubad Talabani, travelled to Germany and met the Chancellor, Angela Merkel, who expressed support for the Kurdistan region of Iraq in line with the Constitution.

32. The Government of Iraq continues to strengthen its regional ties. On 10 December, the Speaker of the Council of Representatives visited Bahrain to attend the thirteenth Manama Dialogue Regional Security Summit. On 9 December, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ibrahim al-Ja'fari, attended a meeting of the League of Arab States in Cairo to discuss the decision of the Government of the United States

of America to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the relocation of its embassy there from Tel Aviv. On 13 December, Mr. Al-Ja'fari participated in the extraordinary session of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Islamic Summit Conference, on Jerusalem, held in Istanbul, Turkey. In his address, he stated that the Government of Iraq considered the decision by the United States to be an act of war that could have a destabilizing effect on the security of the region. He called upon the Government of the United States to reconsider its position. On 18 December, the Speaker of the Council of Representatives attended the extraordinary meeting of the Palestine Committee of the Parliamentary Union of OIC member States, which was hosted by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

33. The Government of Iraq continues to strengthen its economic ties. The Minister of Oil, Jabar al-Lueibi, participated in the meetings on 27 November of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and on 10 December of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries in Kuwait. On 5 and 7 December, an international oil and gas conference was held in Basrah. The conference, which serves as a platform for senior decision makers to discuss technology, solutions and products in the oil and gas industry, was attended by the Minister of Energy of Saudi Arabia, Khalid al-Falih, and representatives of national and international oil companies. Mr. Al-Falih announced the signing of memorandums of understanding between Iraq and Saudi Arabia on oil, gas and other energy projects. On 13 December, Mr. Lueibi stated that he had met the Minister of Energy of Qatar, Mohammed bin Saleh al-Sada, at the meetings in Kuwait, and that they had agreed on investment by Qatar in the gas extraction and refinement and petrochemical sectors.

34. Preparations for an international conference for the reconstruction of Iraq, due to be held from 12 to 14 February 2018 in Kuwait, are well advanced. On 7 December, the Government of Iraq and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, supported by the World Bank, met in Kuwait to brief donors on the preparations for the conference, which will focus on three pillars: the Government's public investment programme, private sector options and social capital, including humanitarian, stabilization and recovery support. My Deputy Special Representative/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator provided an update on the finalization of a new recovery and resilience programme, which will support the Government's national development plan and be launched with the 2018 humanitarian response plan under the social capital pillar of the conference.

III. Update on the activities of the Mission and the United Nations country team

A. Political activities

35. During the reporting period, my Special Representative continued his engagement with government officials, parliamentarians, representatives of political parties, women's groups, civil society and religious and community leaders, congratulating the Government and all Iraqis on their victory over ISIL. He confirmed the unwavering support of UNAMI for the Government of Iraq, guided by the full respect for the Constitution and the law. He underlined the need, in order to safeguard the victory and secure a sustainable peace, particularly in view of the upcoming elections, to take all steps necessary to support the safe, voluntary and dignified return of displaced persons to their homes, provide basic services and security and accelerate the reconstruction of the affected areas. He urged the Government of Iraq to initiate swift legal reforms to ensure that all crimes committed during the conflict were investigated promptly and the perpetrators brought to justice. He confirmed the

support of UNAMI for the Government's reform programme and its efforts to combat corruption.

36. The decision of the federal Supreme Court of 20 November, which ruled the Kurdish referendum unconstitutional and cancelled its results, played a pivotal role in creating the conditions for a constitutional and peaceful way forward to resolve the stalemate between Baghdad and Erbil, as both sides had publicly expressed respect for the decision. My Special Representative continued his engagement with the main stakeholders in Baghdad, Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk. He urged both sides to start a dialogue on all key matters without further delay, based on and in full accordance with the Constitution, which will also guarantee the full constitutional rights of the Kurdish people.

37. With the provincial council and parliamentary elections of May 2018 fast approaching, my Special Representative is engaging intensively with political and parliamentary leaders, as well as with the Independent High Electoral Commission, to underscore the importance of holding elections in an inclusive, participatory, credible and secure way, as scheduled and required by the Constitution. He has also urged that all necessary steps be taken to ensure that conditions are in place for the voluntary, safe and dignified return of displaced persons to their places of origin. This is necessary in order to register them appropriately and allow them to exercise their civil and political rights. He has emphasized that, should displaced persons be unable to return home, it should be made possible for them to exercise their electoral rights in their current location.

38. UNAMI continued its work on national reconciliation. My Special Representative has engaged repeatedly with Iraqi parties and other countries in the region in support of the national settlement project, as a means of ensuring the long-term unity and stability of Iraq, and advocated broader participation in the process. Tribal sheikhs, religious leaders, academics and representatives of political party and civil society from Diyala and Anbar Governorates met twice in November in Baghdad as part of a series of round-table discussions on the theme "National settlement: prospects and challenges", aimed at creating an enabling environment for national reconciliation. A similar round table was held in Najaf in December. Participants at the three events highlighted post-ISIL challenges with regard to the National Settlement Initiative and made recommendations to ensure the success of ongoing reconciliation efforts at the political and societal levels.

39. Women continue to be underrepresented in reconciliation processes at the national level. My Special Representative continues, in discussions with senior political leaders, to actively advocate the effective participation and representation of women in reconciliation and dialogue efforts at all levels. In the context of the global open day on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), UNAMI joined the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) in initiating civil society forums and consultative meetings with women leaders in Karbala' and Basrah, with a view to affording them the space to identify challenges that impede their meaningful and effective participation in political and electoral processes and to formulate a strategy to promote their inclusion in such processes.

40. On 23 and 24 October, UNAMI held consultations with political leaders in Baghdad and Erbil. Chaired by my Special Representative, they aimed at broadening the political space for women. Recommendations were put forward, including using constitutional provisions to further increase the representation of women, amending the electoral framework in order to include provisions encouraging political parties to integrate women in elective public positions and addressing barriers faced by women during the electoral process. UNAMI and UN-Women provided capacity-building for 60 women from nine provincial, district and subdistrict councils from the

southern governorates with a view to strengthening their negotiation strategies and enabling them to create platforms within their communities to impart knowledge.

41. My Special Representative continues to facilitate regular meetings between women leaders and political leaders to discuss challenges and generate greater political will for the meaningful and equal participation of women in political, electoral and reconciliation processes. On 4 December, during the 16 Days of Activism against Gender-based Violence campaign, my Special Representative called for the role of women in State institutions, political parties and economic and social life to be expanded and for enhanced and effective protection of their rights. He underlined that the representation of women in leading positions would give them a stronger voice in guiding the work of political parties, the Council of Representatives and the Government. He has also, in discussions with key interlocutors, advocated the full respect, protection and fulfilment of the rights of women and girls in Iraq with regard to matrimonial and other matters. He has called upon the Council of Representatives to seize the opportunity for wider consultation on the draft personal status law.

42. On 29 November, my Special Representative met Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani in Najaf. He congratulated the Government of Iraq on the victory over ISIL, emphasizing that it was for all Iraq and the world, and that the fatwa of the *marja'iyah*, under which the popular mobilization forces had been established, had been instrumental in defeating ISIL. He also hailed the Grand Ayatollah's call for the rapid, voluntary and dignified return of displaced persons to their homes, enabling at least a minimum level of reconstruction and delivery of services.

43. A senior UNAMI delegation visited Sulaymaniyah on 21 and 22 December to underline the Mission's deep concern about the violence that accompanied the recent demonstrations in the area and to gain access to first-hand information about developments. The delegation met leaders across the political and social spectrum, including the Deputy Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Qubad Talabani, the Governor of Sulaymaniyah, Haval Abubakir, political party representatives and civil society activists.

B. Electoral assistance

44. In response to requests from the Council of Representatives and the federal Independent High Electoral Commission, my Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs authorized the deployment of an electoral needs assessment mission to Iraq from 21 to 30 November. The mission met a wide range of Iraqi interlocutors, including national officials, members of the judiciary, representatives of civil society organizations, women advocates and the media, as well as with representatives of the diplomatic community, UNAMI and United Nations country team staff. The team also visited camps for displaced persons, attended a presentation on election technology newly introduced by the Commission and travelled to Erbil. The initial report of the mission, which highlights electoral assistance requirements and priority areas for United Nations support, has been presented to Iraqi interlocutors and is being finalized.

45. In its letter of 22 November to the Council of Representatives, the Commission stressed, among other matters, the need to finalize amendments to the electoral laws by 20 December. It added that, should they not be finalized, it would follow the current norms and operational procedures. On 2 December, on the occasion of an extraordinary session called by its Speaker, the Council completed the second reading of the first proposed amendment to the Law on Elections to the Council of Representatives (Law No. 45 of 2013). The Legal Committee was subsequently given

the task of consolidating the amendments so that the amended law could be submitted for adoption by 20 December. The matter remains pending, given that the Council is in recess until early January 2018. The Speaker also announced that representatives from Kirkuk were holding meetings regarding the Kirkuk-related provisions of the amendments to the Law on Provincial and District Council Elections (Law No. 36 of 2008).

46. Since the decision by the Council of Ministers to hold the elections to the Council of Representatives on 12 May 2018, the Commission has proceeded with operational preparations. According to its database, more than 24 million Iraqis are eligible to vote. The Commission is distributing new voter cards to more than 11 million voters, including 5.7 million women. As at 17 December, the Commission had registered 134 political parties as eligible to take part in the elections. It extended the deadlines for the registration of political parties and political coalitions to 25 December 2017 and 7 January 2018, respectively. UNAMI continued to engage with the newly appointed Board of Commissioners on several areas deemed critical to the conduct of the elections, including on the newly introduced technology for managing election results and on modalities and mechanisms for enabling the inclusive participation of displaced persons in the elections.

47. The Kurdistan Independent High Electoral Commission suspended preparations for presidential and parliamentary elections in the region following the decision of the regional parliament to postpone them by eight months. The Commission issued a statement in which it urged regional authorities to issue an electoral calendar in order to make the necessary preparations, including for updating the voter registry.

C. Human rights developments and activities

48. Armed conflict, terrorism and acts of violence continued to take a heavy toll on civilians. Between 22 November and 16 December, at least 68 civilian men, women and children were killed, and at least 167 wounded, bringing the total number of civilian casualties in Iraq since January 2014 to at least 85,147 (29,972 killed and 55,175 wounded).

49. UNAMI continued to advocate the need for accountability in the context of human rights violations and abuses committed during the ongoing armed conflict, in particular international crimes that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and, possibly, genocide. Following an Iraqi-led process supported by the Mission, a proposed draft law on the creation of a specialized court for international crimes has been delivered by the Mission to Iraqi institutions and other actors for consideration. The Mission also continued to advocate legal reforms and worked on expanding the capacities of the judiciary to address international crimes effectively. It has also been promoting the proper protection of mass graves, with the aim of collecting and preserving evidence.

50. As ISIL continued to lose control of territory, it increasingly targeted civilians and resorted to guerrilla-type actions, causing civilian casualties. On 4 December, five civilians were killed in the Hawijah district of Kirkuk Governorate. On 5 December, in the same district, ISIL gunmen abducted four civilians. Attacks using explosives, either claimed or apparently carried out by ISIL, also occurred in other governorates. On 21 November, in the city of Tuz Khurmatu, Salah al-Din Governorate, a vehicle laden with explosives was detonated in a crowded market, killing 24 civilians and wounding 60 others, including women and children. On 27 November, an attack by gunmen wearing explosive vests in Baghdad, reportedly claimed by ISIL, left at least 11 civilians dead and at least 25 wounded. Explosive remnants reportedly left by ISIL have also caused civilian casualties. On

29 November, an improvised explosive device exploded in a house in Badush subdistrict, Ninawa Governorate, seriously wounding three children. Furthermore, as at 1 December, 1,507 Yazidi women and girls were reportedly still in ISIL captivity.

51. Mass graves continued to be discovered in areas previously controlled by ISIL. On 28 November, police discovered a mass grave in Hit, Anbar Governorate, containing the remains of at least 12 civilians and members of the police killed by ISIL. On 30 November, a mass grave was discovered in Sinjar district, Ninawa Governorate, reportedly containing the remains of 25 Yazidis killed by the group in June 2014. The Mission has recorded the discovery of 108 mass graves in Iraq resulting from the conflict with ISIL since June 2014.

52. Civilians continued to be targeted by unknown gunmen in Mosul district, Ninawa Governorate. On 28 November, unidentified gunmen stormed a store in eastern Mosul, shooting and killing its owner. On the same day, a group of unidentified armed men stormed the house of a widow in western Mosul, killing her and stealing her money. The identity of the perpetrators and the reasons for the killings are not known.

53. Attacks on the families of suspected ISIL members continued, reportedly with the objective of expelling them or preventing them from returning to their homes. On 13 October, the Iraqi security forces reportedly ordered families of suspected ISIL members to leave Hit within 72 hours. Subsequently, between 26 October and 4 November, seven houses were attacked by unknown assailants. An undetermined number of other families whose houses were marked moved out of Hit. Between 8 and 20 November, in three villages on the western side of Sharqat district, Salah al-Din Governorate, unknown assailants using improvised explosive devices blew up at least 20 houses belonging to families of suspected ISIL members.

54. During the reporting period, the Country Task Force on Children and Armed Conflict, co-chaired by the Mission and the United Nations Children's Fund, received reports of 24 incidents involving violations against a total of 59 children. Twenty of the incidents, affecting 56 children mostly in Ninawa and Salah al-Din Governorates, were verified. Ten of them involved killing and maiming, with 14 children confirmed killed and 12 maimed. Moreover, 30 boys were verified to have been recruited and used as fighters. Five incidents of attacks on schools and another four of the use of schools for military purposes were verified. The situation of children in Iraq remains a source of much concern. The Mission continues to discuss with the Government the establishment of an interministerial committee on grave violations of the rights of the child and the provision of support for the reintegration of children formerly associated with ISIL.

55. Incidents of shelling occurred in Tuz Khurmatu, including the Aksu, Jamila and Jamhuri areas, on 9 December, killing one child and wounding 12 civilians, including two women. On 12 December, shelling caused casualties among the popular mobilization forces near the city's police headquarters. The identity of the attackers is unknown. The Mission investigated, including through missions on the ground, allegations of human rights abuses in the city. It observed some 100 shops burned out or damaged along the main market road in Jamhuri. It is likely that additional damage was caused in areas that the Mission was unable to reach. It asked the Iraqi authorities to take all measures necessary to protect civilians in Tuz Khurmatu, facilitate the safe, dignified and voluntary return of internally displaced persons and bring to justice those responsible for the violations that had occurred since mid-October.

56. Challenges with regard to the collection, analysis and reporting of information on conflict-related sexual violence as a specific category of human rights violation continue to be noted. The Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangements Working Group, which was set up in August 2017, is focusing on ensuring that information is

collected, analysed and reported in line with the provisional guidance note on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1960 (2010) on women and peace and security. Risks associated with reporting remain a source of concern for some victims and their families, as well as for those working on those issues.

57. Progress continues towards finalizing an action plan on the implementation of the joint communiqué signed by Iraq and the United Nations on the prevention of and response to conflict-related sexual violence. While that is encouraging, there is a need to assess to what extent the national action plan on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) has been implemented and the challenges that it faces, in order to use that information as a reference for possible challenges to the implementation of the draft action plan on the joint communiqué. Furthermore, the Government and its partners have underscored the importance, in developing the plan, of recognizing that victims of sexual violence do not constitute a homogenous group, but originate from the country's diverse religious and ethnic communities, including Yazidi, Turkmen Shi'a, Christian and Sunni components. The implementation of the plan will require responses tailored to the needs of those groups, while also working towards ensuring that the specific needs of women, men, girls and boys are taken into account.

D. Humanitarian assistance, stabilization and development

58. Although large-scale military operations against ISIL have concluded, the humanitarian crisis continues, putting millions of Iraqi civilians at risk. At the close of the combat operations, 2.9 million of the nearly 6 million Iraqis displaced since the rise of ISIL are still outside their homes. Some 86 camps for displaced persons, including 19 near Mosul, continue to be supported by humanitarian partners. During the final stages of the military operations against ISIL in western Anbar, 16,500 people were displaced to camps in Anbar, Salah al-Din and Ninawa Governorates. The Ministry of Migration and Displaced Persons and humanitarian partners delivered food, emergency kits, mobile health services and other forms of assistance to more than 30,000 people, including in the recently retaken city of Rawah, Anbar Governorate.

59. The military realignment in disputed areas has had an adverse impact on humanitarian access. Several checkpoints and crossings have been closed to humanitarian partners for months, limiting access to more than 550,000 civilians in northern Ninawa and Kirkuk Governorates. Civilians continue to be killed when returning to booby-trapped houses. The Mine Action Service is responding by prioritizing risk education and accelerating the survey and clearance of improvised explosive devices in newly liberated areas, including in the towns of Hawijah and Riyadh, which are heavily contaminated.

60. In early November, the Government announced its intention to facilitate the return of 2.5 million Iraqis prior to the May elections. Following the announcement, 23,000 people were affected by arbitrary evictions in Anbar and Salah al-Din Governorates. In response to advocacy by my Deputy Special Representative/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, the Prime Minister's Office has reconfirmed the Government's commitment to safe, voluntary and dignified returns and instructed local authorities to cease evictions. The introduction of a Kirkuk Governorate reconciliation agreement, signed by officials, community members and religious leaders on 25 November 2017 and intended to protect returnees affiliated to ISIL, is expected to encourage further returns.

61. During the reporting period, the UNDP Funding Facility for Stabilization continued to support the repair of public infrastructure, provide grants to small businesses and households headed by women, boost the capacity of local governments

and provide short-term employment through public works schemes in areas directly affected by the conflict with ISIL. More than 1,500 projects are under way or have been completed in 23 liberated towns and districts in the Governorates of Anbar, Ninawa, Salah al-Din, Diyala and Kirkuk, employing tens of thousands of people to clear rubble, clean streets, beautify neighbourhoods and repair public buildings. Nearly 550 projects are under way in Mosul. In collaboration with UNDP, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, the Mine Action Service has started clearance work in the old city and is continuing to clear the Shifa' hospital complex in western Mosul, which ISIL used as its headquarters in the area. Teams have removed more than 2,000 explosive hazards, enabling the Ministry of Health to relocate life-saving medical equipment to a functional hospital in eastern Mosul. The Funding Facility is also prioritizing 164 projects in 10 priority Christian towns in the Ninawa plains. On 22 November, my Deputy Special Representative/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator opened the Tikrit teaching hospital, a landmark stabilization project that will benefit more than 250,000 people in Salah al-Din Governorate.

62. UNDP continued to support the Office of the National Security Adviser in the development and implementation of the security sector reform programme approved by the Prime Minister and the National Security Council in July 2017. The programme focuses on seven areas: defence and federal security; intelligence; critical national infrastructure protection; democratic governance and oversight; national security architecture; criminal justice and law enforcement, including civilian and local policing; and national security legislation. During the reporting period, priority tasks and workplans were developed in each of those seven areas. They were due to be submitted to the National Security Adviser for consideration at the end of December. In parallel, UNDP is supporting the development of a monitoring and evaluation framework for each of the seven areas, in order to support the Government in tracking the progress of reform.

E. Security and operational issues

63. The United Nations in Iraq continues to deliver its programmes and activities in a complex and changing security environment. Despite significant security challenges, the United Nations and its partners remain actively engaged in humanitarian and development activities, on the basis of programme criticality and in close coordination with the Government.

64. Construction and renovation in the integrated United Nations compound in Baghdad have continued, with 79 new anti-blast, environmentally sensitive accommodation units completed and renovation work on infrastructure, offices and other facilities ongoing. Following travel restrictions on international flights to and from Erbil airport, the Mission has increased the frequency and number of its own flights there as a contingency measure to enable United Nations staff stationed in northern Iraq to fly in and out of Iraq through Baghdad International Airport. As part of its greening initiatives, the Mission has extended its photovoltaic farm project and the installation of hybrid solar systems for its information and communication technology sites.

IV. Observations

65. I congratulate the people and the Government of Iraq on their victory against ISIL and I hope that all Iraqis will be able to live in peace, dignity and prosperity,

with their human rights respected and protected. The military defeat of ISIL opens a new phase for Iraq. The Government's reform programme, including efforts to combat corruption, enjoys the full support of the United Nations. The Government must ensure that the military defeat of ISIL translates into a victory for accountability and an end to impunity.

66. I strongly urge the Government to redouble its efforts to expeditiously create the conditions necessary for the voluntary, safe and dignified return of displaced persons.

67. Meanwhile, terrorism remains a threat. I reiterate that it is important for the Iraqi authorities to continuously take measures to protect the lives of civilians and their property. The root causes of terrorism will remain intact unless hateful and exclusionary ideology is defeated. I urge the authorities to take all measures necessary to continue the battle against that ideology, notably by eliminating its financial sources and reinforcing counter-narratives that promote tolerance and coexistence. It is of the utmost importance for the authorities to protect all citizens, especially young people, from being influenced by ISIL and other violent and extreme ideologies and to prevent them from joining terrorist organizations.

68. I reiterate the importance of continuing to advance the security sector reform strategy. All security forces should be placed under the control of the Government. A failure to enforce that principle could lead to renewed instability in post-ISIL Iraq, especially in the liberated areas and the disputed areas. The United Nations stands ready to provide support in that regard.

69. With a view to promoting stability in Iraq, I appeal to countries in the region to work with the Government, building on mutual interests, to pursue the deepening of political and economic ties to promote employment and a comprehensive development programme. With the victory against ISIL, Iraq should now focus on reconstruction.

70. I urge the international community to remain generous in their support to Iraq, including at the upcoming international conference for the reconstruction of Iraq, to be held in Kuwait in February. Having achieved a historic victory against ISIL, continued support in the humanitarian, stabilization, explosive hazard mitigation and development areas, in addition to support for reconstruction and economic stimulus, will be critical in responding to some underlying issues that contributed to the rise of ISIL in the country. Those issues will need to be addressed in order to solidify military gains, reduce the threat of insurgency and achieve durable stability and security for the people of Iraq.

71. With regard to relations between Baghdad and Erbil, I take note of the ruling of 20 November of the federal Supreme Court and call upon the federal Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government to initiate a dialogue without further delay so as to address all outstanding issues in line with the Constitution. At the same time, I reiterate that all parties concerned should avoid confrontation, the use of force or the threat thereof and inflammatory statements. Sustainable solutions can be achieved only by pursuing a genuine dialogue. The United Nations remains ready to provide facilitation in that regard, if so requested by the federal Government and the Kurdistan Regional Government.

72. The Council of Ministers has set the election date for 12 May 2018, in accordance with constitutional and legal timelines. It is of crucial importance that all efforts be made to enable the conduct of the elections in a conducive, credible and inclusive environment in which all Iraqis, men and women, from all governorates, are given the opportunity to participate and for their votes to be duly counted. I welcome the commitment by the Council of Ministers to ensuring a safe environment in which